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Sept. 2, 2016 Draft 
STRANDED COSTS AND GRID DECARBONIZATION 
Emily Hammond* & Jim Rossi** 
ABSTRACT 
Energy law is well equipped to facilitate the transition to a decarbonized grid.  Over the past half 
century, energy law has endured many stranded cost experiments, each helping firms and 
customers adjust to a new normal.  However, these past experiments have contributed to a 
myopic regulatory approach to past stranded cost recovery by:  (1) endorsing a preference for 
addressing all stranded costs only after energy resource investment decisions have been made; 
and (2) fixating on the firm’s financial costs and protection of investors, rather than on the 
broader impacts of each on the energy system.   
The current transition to decarbonization is already giving rise to stranded cost claims related to 
existing energy assets like coal-fired and nuclear power plants.  New energy infrastructure 
investments—such as natural gas pipelines and natural gas-fired power plants--will also face 
stranded cost issues once they have provided the expected  bridge to a clean energy future. 
We see the transition to grid decarbonization as a propitious opportunity for energy law to 
improve its approach to stranded cost compensation for investor risks.  Unlike with past energy 
industry changes, where stranded costs were routinely addressed after investment decisions were 
made, it is important for regulators to address stranded costs now, at the outset of the transition 
to a decarbonized grid.  As in the past, stranded cost compensation will prove important, if not 
essential, to this impending energy transition.  But it should be approached in a manner that 
helps to overcome the obstacles to a decarbonized grid, reassure investors in new infrastructure 
without distorting capital signals to favor legacy resources, and recognize important energy 
resource attributes that competitive markets fail to price.   
INTRODUCTION 
Change is at the center of today’s debates regarding how to transition to a low-
carbon energy infrastructure.  Achieving an 80% reduction from 1990 carbon emission 
levels by the year 20501 will require increased renewables penetration,2 near-term 
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  
** Professor, Vanderbilt Law School. 
1 This is roughly the level of emissions reduction necessary to meet the commonly agreed upon goal in the 
international community of limiting anthropogenic increase in global mean surface temperatures to less 
than 2 degrees Celsius.  See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES xi (November 
2014), at http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/US-Deep-Decarbonization-Report.pdf [hereinafter 
“PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION”].   
2 Nat’l Renewable Energy Laboraty, Renewable Electricity Futures Study (2012), Executive Summary, at 
30 (estimating electricity demand could be met by 80% renewable sources by 2050), at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/52409-ES.pdf. 
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reliance on significant amounts of new natural gas power generation,3 a potential major 
transition away from traditional base load power plants,4 significant investment in 
distributed generation and new technologies,5 and increased focus on demand-side 
measures.6 But given the industry’s stationary capital assets with financial and 
operational lives ranging from 50-80 years in length, energy infrastructure can change 
only at a slow pace.  Path dependency threatens “carbon lock-in,” which could thwart any 
successful transition to a low carbon energy system.7 To the extent that grid 
decarbonization adversely affects the economic value of a significant portion of current 
assets (such as older coal plants), some industry investors and analysts have even raised 
concerns that the impending disruptions of change could lead to financial distress, 
hardship and, at the extreme, catastrophe.8 
3 Cf. Steve Weissman, Natural Gas as a Bridge Fuel: Measuring the Bridge, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY 1 (Mar. 2016) (noting near-term need but cautioning against long-term natural gas reliance). 
4 See LUCY JOHNSTON & RACHEL WILSON, STRATEGIES FOR DECARBONIZING THE ELECTRIC POWER 
SUPPLY 6-7 (Regulatory Assistance Project 2012), online at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK
Ewjk6f-
Mv6jNAhVPc1IKHUawDPUQFghTMAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.raponline.org%2Fdocument%2Fd
ownload%2Fid%2F259&usg=AFQjCNGKA2nczeApiKKNrN-HxCF31v_7XA&sig2=W1gP-
7C5Z_mfvQpxFYXBVw&bvm=bv.124272578,d.aXo (noting that more than 70 percent of U.S. coal-fired 
capacity is more than 30 years old). 
5 See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 887 (2016) (considering regulatory 
needs for incorporating distributed generation into grid reliability policymaking); Amy L. Stein, 
Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697 
(2014) (considering regulatory needs for emerging technologies like energy storage). 
6 See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note 1. 
7 As Gregory Unruh describes: 
. . . . industrial economies have been locked into fossil-fuel based energy systems through a 
process of technological and institutional co-evolution driven by path-dependent increasing 
returns to scale.  It is asserted that this condition, termed carbon lock-in, creatsed persistent market 
and policy failure that can inhibit the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies despite their 
apparent environmental and economic advantages. 
Gregory Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817, 817 (2000). 
8 See, e.g., Elisabeth Grarry & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for 
Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 2 (2014); DELOITTE, THE NEW MATH:  SOLVING THE EQUATION FOR 
DISRUPTION TO THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR (2013), at 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/energy-resources/us-energyandresources-
the-new-math.pdf; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND 
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS (January 2013),2013), at  
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf.  See also Alex Morales, 
“Stranded Assets:”  Will Efforts to Counter Warming Render Energy Reserves Worthless?, WASHINGTON 
POST, Dec. 5, 2014, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/stranded-assets-will-efforts-to-counter-
warming-render-energy-reserves-worthless/2014/12/05/ecbc73a6-7a45-11e4-9a27-
6fdbc612bff8_story.html (describing a similar threat to the fossil fuel industry more generally).  To 
underscore the significant of stranding impacts of the impending transition, one study envisions that the 
global stranded cost impact of the impending transition is in the range of $25 trillion for the entire energy 
sector.  See DAVID NELSON, ET AL., MOVING TO LOW-CARBON ECONOMY: THE IMPACT OF POLICY 
PATHWAYS ON FOSSIL FUEL; ASSET VALUES iv (Climate Policy Initative 2014), at 
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Moving-to-a-Low-Carbon-Economy-The-
Impacts-of-Policy-Pathways-on-Fossil-Fuel-Asset-Values.pdf. 
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Energy law can deal with such change.  On many occasions over the past half 
century, energy law has been required to confront the “stranded costs” of transitions—
that is, the value of a regulated firm’s investments left shipwrecked by changing 
regulatory circumstances.  From an accounting standpoint, stranded costs are defined as 
the difference between an asset’s book value—including such things as power generating 
equipment—and its market value.9 From a regulatory compact standpoint (discussed in 
more detail momentarily), stranded costs are those investments that a utility has incurred 
to meet its obligations to serve customers with an expectation of cost recovery through 
rates, but which may no longer be recoverable due to a change in the rules or new market 
competition in the industry.10 Our initial working definition of stranded costs is simple: 
We focus on existing energy infrastructure that retains some useful life but that can no 
longer generate initially expected revenue due to regulatory shifts, market forces, or 
innovation.  But as we also discuss, in the transition to decarbonization the stranded cost 
issue will be just as significant for new investments in energy resources as it is for 
existing infrastructure.  
This Article maintains that the traditional approach energy regulators have used to 
compensate stranded costs for existing resources during industry transitions has suffered 
from myopia and must be reformed to address the transition to decarbonization.  The 
traditional notion of stranded costs is embedded in an understanding of regulation known 
as the “regulatory compact (or contract),”11 where the utility takes on an obligation to 
serve customers and, in return, is guaranteed an opportunity to recover the costs of its 
investments. This approach worked for decades to provide some degree of certainty to 
investors, though its flaws are also well known.12 In addressing new stranded cost 
challenges and opportunities, energy law can best facilitate a balance between promoting 
investor certainty and providing flexibility by being proactive, recognizing that past 
approaches to stranded cost recovery could just as easily thwart as facilitate 
decarbonization. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I argues that stranded cost recovery 
mechanisms over the past 50 years have fixated on honoring the “deal” of the regulatory 
contract for incumbent firms and their investors. Furthermore, regulators have seriously 
grappled with transition costs issues only after a change in conditions has occurred.  Each 
time a new energy transition takes place, energy regulators have provided for significant 
stranded cost compensation, though it is not always clear that the manner in which they 
did so provided sound investment signals for the energy system.  Moreover, stranded cost 
9 Charles Stalon, Stranded Investment Costs: Desirable and Less Desirable Solutions, in Proceedings: What 
are the Transition Costs to a More Competitive Market and Who Should Pay?, at 2 (June 15, 1994). 
10 William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. Pol’y 835, 835 (1995). 
11 See Jersey Century Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., conc.) 
(referencing the term). 
12 Particularly salient examples include the numerous canceled nuclear and coal-fired power plants in the 
1980s and the major shifts associated with moving to competitive electricity markets. See, e.g., John 
Burrett McArthur, Cost Responsibility or Regulatory Indulgence for Electricity’s Stranded Costs?, 47 AM. 
U. L. REV. 775 (1998) (electricity restructuring); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in 
Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1984) (coal and nuclear). See 
infra at Part I.A for further discussion. 
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recovery has often stood in the way of change, failing to sufficiently address the 
“stranded benefits” of new transitions13 or the broader social values advanced by industry 
transitions.  In large part this has happened because stranded cost recovery has been 
addressed only ex post, when a fixation on losses to a firm’s existing investments drives 
the discussion.  We maintain that this stranded cost myopia has distorted some basic 
investments signals, magnified an excess capacity problem with some base load power 
generation facilities, thwarted new entrants, and prolonged the energy sector’s 
dependency on existing energy infrastructure, including many fossil fuel plants.     
 
Part II turns to the energy sector’s transition to decarbonization.  The transition to 
a new, low-carbon normal challenges every part of this sector, including resource 
extraction, power generation, transmission, and distribution.  Given regulators’ past 
appetite for stranded cost compensation, we can expect incumbent firms to raise new 
calls for stranded cost compensation each time a new change is proposed.14  Even now, 
several coal companies have already filed for bankruptcy, some nuclear power plants are 
at risk for early closure, and local utilities are fighting rooftop solar incentives such as net 
metering.15 At the same time, policymakers and industry representatives often speak of 
natural gas, and increasingly, nuclear power, as bridge fuels that will facilitate the 
transition to a low carbon future.16  The simple reality is that energy regulation is not 
particularly adept at “temporary”—and once approved, incumbent firms expect their 
assets to stay in operation and produce revenue as long as they can convince regulators to 
allow it.  At the very minimum, if left unaddressed these stranded cost issues threaten to 
delay the transition to decarbonization.   
 
As discussed in Part III, the transition to decarbonization requires regulators to 
address stranded costs, though to avoid carbon lock-in they must apply similar principles 
to both new and old energy infrastructure.  Even so, as Part III also discusses, this does 
not necessarily mean the end of stranded cost recovery with a transition towards 
decarbonization.  Rather, we expect stranded cost issues to be as important as ever. 
Investors will continue to seek some commitment from the regulatory process before 
																																																								13	“Stranded	benefits,”		arethose	offsetting	benefits	that	transitions	can	create	for	firms	in	an	industry	or	their	investors.		See	infra,	Part	I.B.2.				14	See,	e.g.,	Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV.  1617, 1700 (2004) (reviewing GOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: 
MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION (2003)); William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the 
Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383 (2002). 
15 See Richard Martin, Battles Over Net Metering Cloud the Future of Rooftop Solar, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 
5, 2016), at https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545146/battles-over-net-metering-cloud-the-future-of-
rooftop-solar/ (describing several such challenges). 
16 Weissman, supra note 3, at 1; see also N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting A Clean Energy 
Standard, Nos. 15-E-0302 & 16-E-0270, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2016) (listing among purposes of new clean energy 
standard “to preserve existing zero-emissions nuclear generation resources as a bridge to the clean energy 
future”). New York has approved a Clean Energy Standard, that, among other things, seeks to maintain its 
nuclear fleet as the state transitions to a low-carbon future, in which it aims for 50% non-emitting 
electricity by 2050. See Denis Grab & Burcin Unel, New York’s Clean Energy Standard Is a Key Step 
Toward Pricing Carbon Fairly, UTILITY DIVE, Aug. 18, 2016, at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-
yorks-clean-energy-standard-is-a-key-step-toward-pricing-carbon-pollut/424741/.   
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moving forward,17  and each successive capital investment decision in new energy 
infrastructure will represent an irreversible choice for decades into the future.  But these 
concerns need not necessitate a wholesale reconstruction of energy law.  Rather, we think 
that the transition to a post-carbon energy sector presents regulators an opportunity to 
draw from some of energy law’s traditional tools to better approach risk compensation—
encouraging a more adaptive and flexible grid than in the past, while also attracting new 
investment by addressing stranded costs proactively in ways that recognize both market 
and non-market values.   
 
Moving forward, a presumption in favor of stranded cost compensation based on 
the fact of past stranded compensation could be counterproductive, delaying and 
frustrating the transition towards decarbonization.  But realistically, some stranded cost 
compensation will be essential to the decarbonization transition.  If approached in a 
careful manner, stranded cost recovery can facilitate a transition toward decarbonization 
by encouraging investors and firms to better price the core market and non-market 
attributes of energy resources.  In order to do so, regulators need to pay attention to the 
timing of cost allocation, avoiding the temptation to address stranded costs only at the 
back end of the carbon transition.  For example, as discussed in more detail below,  
regulators making decisions regarding major new infrastructure projects like pipelines 
and transmission lines should be attentive to stranded cost issues before approving 
projects, instead of waiting to address stranded costs only after change has occurred.18   
 
Regulators providing for stranded cost recovery must also be attentive to social 
values that are not currently priced in energy markets. Changes associated with 
decarbonization present a particularly propitious opportunity for regulators to address 
important values such as reliability and carbon impacts of various energy resources in 
stranded cost compensation, especially where the competitive energy markets fail to price 
these features of energy resources.19  This Article proposes some ways for stranded cost 
recovery to better recognize these positive benefits associated with regulatory transitions 
for new energy resources, without conflicting with federal energy market policy.  
 
Reforms that address regulatory risk through early stranded cost recovery will 
inevitably come at some cost to consumers in the near term, yet a return on investment is 
imperative to attracting capital for new infrastructure that will facilitate a balanced 
portfolio of energy resources for a decarbonized grid. 20  If stranded costs for both new 
and old resources are addressed with similar principles in mind, we believe that the net 
																																																								
17 Eliminating such commitments altogether would likely drive up the overall cost of capital for regulated 
utilities. See Emily Hammond & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of 
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 GEO.W. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1 (2016). 
18 See infra Part III.B.1. 19	For	discussion	of	the	general	issue,	see	Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract 
in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV.  141 (2016).	
20 Low returns available to investors are often seen as a barrier to attracting the investment necessary to 
decarbonize the electric power sector.  See, e.g., WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY: 
ATTRACTING INVESTMENT TO BUILD TOMORROW’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR (2015), at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFUSA_FutureOfElectricity_Report2015.pdf. 
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effect will be to reduce the overall cost of capital related to investment in a decarbonized 
energy system.  
 
I. Energy Law’s Stranded Cost History 
 
Over the past half century, the energy sector has undergone some remarkable 
transformations.  The regulatory contract that has predominated energy law’s history 
envisions a utility taking on customer service obligations in exchange for a guarantee that 
its investors will be compensated for risk.21  Even with traditional rate regulation, 
changing economic conditions, technological obsolescence, and unexpected shifts in 
regulatory approach have presented a threat to investors in energy firms.22  Specifically, 
investors have faced a risk that an energy utility’s investments would be rendered 
stranded as a result of transitions.  If energy law did not find ways to compensate 
investors for stranded costs, this could adversely affect the overall cost of capital for new 
infrastructure, requiring firms to incur higher interest rates to attract debt and equity 
investors.   
 
Over the past half century, the energy industry has undergone three important 
stranded cost experiments:  disallowance of construction costs for canceled nuclear 
power plants in the 1980s;23 “take-or-pay” natural gas supply contracts associated with 
open access in gas pipelines;24 and stranded power generation assets associated with a 
transition to competitive electric power markets.25  As described in more detail below, in 
each of these scenarios significant amounts of economic capital were threatened by 
transition.  As each transition took place, energy investors (and utilities) made forecasts 
of major economic loss and, at the extreme, financial catastrophe.  In most instances, 
regulators drew on tools (often with controversy) to mitigate adverse financial impacts 
associated with impending transition.  By deferring any focus on compensating investors 
for the risks of change to the future, regulators in the past were able to keep the cost of 
new capital for energy firms low, although once chonge was imminent the focus shifted 
to stranded cost compensation as a way to address these risks ex post.   
 
Despite some industry prognostications, the sky never did fall with past energy 
industry transitions.  But that also does not mean that stranded cost compensation always 																																																								21	See	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	[22],	at	149-51	(describing	traditional	regulation).	22	E.g.,	Pierce,	supra	note	[12]	.	
23 Though less frequently mentioned, this issue extended to coal-fired plants as well. See Pierce, Regulatory 
Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12] (documenting both nuclear and coal-fired plant 
cancellations).  24	E.g.,	Holly	C.	Doane,	Take-Or-Pay:	FERC’s	Regulatory	Dilemma,	2	Spg.	Natural	Res.	&	Env’t	18,	18	(1987)	(“No	other	issue	in	the	history	of	the	Federal	Energy	Regulatory	Commission	(FERC)	has	caused	such	paralysis	.	.	.	.”).	25	See	Jim	Rossi,	The	Electric	Deregulation	Fiasco:	Looking	Toward	Regulatory	
Federalism	to	Promote	a	Balance	Between	Markets	and	the	Provision	of	Public	Goods,	100	MICH.	L.	REV.	1768,	1778-79	&	n.25	(describing	stranded	cost	recovery	associated	with	California	deregulation	and	collecting	criticisms).	
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produced good results.  In the past, regulators consistently favored stranded cost 
compensation ex post—that is, after projects (and their expected investments costs) had 
been approved, and sometimes decades after assets had been constructed and used to 
produce and deliver energy.  By only really addressing the issue of stranded costs after 
initial investment decisions have been made, many regulators based stranded cost 
calculations on perceived investor losses related to a large-scale, already-approved capital 
asset.  This ex post environment for determining stranded costs invited industry 
stakeholders to present regulators with grossly exaggerated claims of the adverse impact 
of a transition on the firm’s investors, and to present little or no evidence of how change 
would produce benefits for the firm or others.  This approach to stranded cost 
compensation may have assuaged regulators, firms, and their investors, but it resulted in a 
myopia that exaggerated stranded costs losses to investors, delayed regulatory change, 
and ignored any broader assessment of the social costs and benefits associated with 
transitioning.  Regulators determining stranded costs in this manner did a poor job of 
separating the ordinary economic and technological risks that any business investor 
would expect, from regulatory risks over which firms have little or no control.  
 
A. Past Stranded Cost Experiments 
 
As should be evident, discussions of stranded costs in the energy industry are 
hardly new.  Threats to investor expectations due to new technologies or changing 
economic conditions have a long legacy in regulated industries.  For example, the impact 
of new technologies and new market entrants was at the core of the dispute of the 
landmark Charles River Bridge case, which clarified principles surrounding monopoly 
and innovation prior to industrial development.26  In deciding that important case 180 
years ago, the Supreme Court endorsed the principle that a monopoly’s charter should be 
interpreted narrowly to favor new entrants.27  Yet stranded cost compensation 
experiments over the past 50 years in the energy industry seem to run against the grain of 
this longstanding principle, with regulators consistently finding ways to ensure that 
investor-backed expectations are not upset by industry changes.  As these experiments 
show, instead of being wary of stranded costs, regulators have shown a considerable 
appetite for compensating investors post hoc, routinely approving customer charges 
designed to guarantee an incumbent energy utility 100% compensation for stranded costs 
during regulatory, economic and technological transitions in the energy sector.   
 
1. Excess Capacity and Canceled Nuclear Power Plants 
 
One high profile stranded cost issue was associated with new nuclear power 
plants—many of which were canceled mid-construction—and the subsequent 
disallowance of cost recovery by regulatory commissions in the 1970s and 80s.28  In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, nuclear power looked like a prudent investment: electricity 																																																								
26 The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. the Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).   
27 Id.  For discussion see STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION:  THE CHARLES 
RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971).   
28 See EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 400-02 (4th ed. 2015) (describing 
changes in the nuclear energy sector over time). 
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demand was projected to sharply increase, and nuclear power (and coal) appeared to be a 
far better investment than oil- and gas-fired plants.29  Not only was nuclear power 
projected to be less costly to operate, but natural gas was in very short supply, and the 
United States had national security concerns about relying on foreign oil.30 But by the late 
1970s and into the 1980s, things changed. Demand did not increase as expected, Three 
Mile Island prompted concerns about the safety of nuclear power, and both world oil and 
the domestic natural gas markets underwent substantial price reductions. Utilities were 
left holding excess generating capacity, and it became clear that newer power generation 
technologies could produce power more cheaply than nuclear plants. Over 120 partially 
constructed plants were canceled, and the question of how to address the resulting 
stranded costs loomed large.31  
 
In the end, many of these plants received full or at least partial cost recovery. As 
Richard Pierce describes it, the policy effect of the regulatory response was to provide 
many private utilities compensation for what, in retrospect, were considered mistakes—
perhaps in part because the regulatory process encouraged investment in large base load 
power generation plants.32 Forcing the utilities to bear the full costs of cancelations would 
have ignored this regulatory relationship and, moreover, would serve to increase the 
overall cost of capital associated with these investments, perhaps putting the utility out of 
business.33 On the other hand, allowing full cost recovery for every loss a firm would 
incur due to mistaken investment decisions would unfairly burden customers—making it 
politically untenable and significantly diverging from how a competitive market would 
approach investment risks.34   
 
Some jurisdictions famously did not allow for stranded cost recovery at all. In the 
landmark decision Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,35 for example, the Supreme Court 
rejected a Takings Clause challenge brought by the owners of canceled nuclear power 
plants that had been denied cost recovery for investments that had been deemed prudent 
when they were initially made.36 More often, however, state commissions allowed 
nuclear power companies to recover from customers at least some of their stranded costs, 
																																																								
29 Pierce, Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect. supra note [12] at 500-01.   
30 Id. 
31 EISEN ET AL., supra note [31], at 401. 
32 See Pierce, Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12].   
33 See Legislative Utility Consumers’ Council v. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 402 A.2d 626 
(N.H. 1979) (describing financial struggles of utility undertaking nuclear power plant construction). 
34 Pierce, Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12], at 506. 
35 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
36 Id. at 302-03. Though the Court was not receptive to utilities’ claim that the Constitution requires 
stranded cost recovery for cancelled nuclear plants, it also did not dismiss the idea that the Constitution 
provides a floor to protect investor-based expectations.  At the extreme, the Court noted, a rate still could 
be so low that it is confiscatory, especially if a firm is not allowed to compensate its investors at all for the 
financial risks that they incur.  Id. at 315 (citing FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S., 591 602 (1944) 
(“[R]eturn to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises 
having corresponding risks.”)).  In addition, a regulator cannot “arbitrarily switch back and forth between 
methodologies in a way which required investors to bear the risks of bad investments at some times while 
denying them the benefits of good investments at others . . . .”  Id. at 315.   
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whether these were attributed to excess capacity or for canceled plants.37 And a few 
plants under construction during this time were permitted to recover from customers for 
construction works in progress (CWIP), representing regulators’ recognition of the 
uncertain economic and regulatory environment for new nuclear plants and the need for 
substantial lines of credit early in the construction phase.38  
 
Significantly, canceled nuclear plants were not a transition cost that regulators or 
investors had accurately predicted at the time that plants were approved in the first place.  
Rather, these stranded cost recovery decisions were routinely made after plants had 
undergone “prudency” review (the reasonableness review rate regulators apply to new 
investments) and were approved for construction.  Still, routine ex post stranded cost 
recovery, independent of the initial decision of the firm (and its investors) to incur the 
costs of nuclear power generation facilities, could have an undeniable impact on the cost 
of capital and investment decisions.  If, at the time of making investment decisions, 
investors had routinely expected this kind of ex post compensation (and perhaps the 
regulatory contract encouraged them to do so), the initial cost of capital for a regulated 
utility would be lower than that of a competitive firm because utility regulators (and the 
regulatory contract) effectively insured the risk of change for private investors.  Against 
the backdrop of rate regulation, this artificially low cost of capital could have encouraged 
overinvestment in large “base load” plants (i.e., those that must run at or near their full 
capacity to meet customer load, typically nuclear and coal plants), contributing even 
further to excess capacity.  On the other hand, if no compensation for harms caused by 
regulatory change was expected by investors ex ante (i.e., at the time of the initial 
investment in the firm), investors would demand a risk premium (and a higher return on 
investment) to insure themselves against the possibility of change, so without stranded 
cost recovery the firm’s cost of capital would need to be priced higher to reflect this risk.  
A higher cost of capital would have discouraged new investments in these assets, given 
that regulators were attentive to the cost of capital in approving new investments and 
setting utility rates, so some stranded cost recovery provided regulators a delicate way of 
balancing a need for investor certainty to attract capital with regulators need to keep the 
cost of capital for new infrastructure as low as possible, to minimize the immediate 
impacts of new infrastructure on customer rates.   
2. Natural Gas Pipelines and Take-Or-Pay Contracts 
A second stranded cost recovery experiment from the past half-century is 
associated with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) implementation of 
open access in natural gas pipelines to encourage competition in interstate gas supply 
markets.  Congress began restructuring the natural gas industry in the late 1980s by 																																																								
37 Examples are detailed throughout Pierce, Regulatory Treatent of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12] 
. 
38 E.g., Legislative Utility Consumers’ Council v. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 402 A.2d 626 
(N.H. 1979) (upholding state commission’s authority to allow construction funds for Seabrook nuclear 
plant to be recovered in CWIP); cf. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1185-86 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that FERC might permissibly allow utilities to include some unamortized costs of 
canceled plants in rate base). 
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unbundling gas sales from pipeline transportation services and providing equal access to 
the latter.39  This approach recognized that traditional gas regulation’s approach to setting 
single rate for pipeline gas had failed to see that there are two or more distinct markets 
bundled together, only one of which is a natural monopoly (i.e., the “pipes”).  FERC set 
out to “unbundle” these distinct markets, implementing an “open access” regulatory 
scheme that applies only to the natural monopoly market so that all producers had 
comparable access to the pipelines to ship their gas to the buyer who offers them the best 
deal.40  
However, pipelines’ stranded costs presented a barrier to the transition to this new 
competitive market.41  In order to support pipeline construction and operation, many 
pipelines had committed billions of dollars in long-term “take-or-pay” contracts at very 
high prices.  These contracts obligated pipelines to pay suppliers, even when pipelines 
could not take the gas.42  In initially addressing the transition to pipeline deregulation, 
FERC refused to grant pipeline requests for take-or-pay relief.43  FERC’s Order 436,44 
described by the D.C. Circuit as a “complete restructuring” of the industry,45 did not 
provide for any take-or-pay compensation because pipelines were successfully 
negotiating themselves out of these obligations without FERC’s assistance.46  But the 
S.C. Circuit vacated Order 436, accusing FERC of  “blindness” to the impacts of open 
access on pipelines, as well as a “tendency to elevate into affirmative benefits what are at 
best palliatives.”47  Without tangible take-or-pay contract relief, the D.C. Circuit likened 
the voluntary open access option FERC had provided pipelines to “the choice between 
the noose and the firing squad.”48  When FERC continued to refuse any compensation for 
take-or-pay contracts on remand, the D.C. Circuit again rejected the agency’s approach, 
charging FERC with attempting to delay indefinitely until the issue went away.49   
FERC addressed the issue in Order 500, which adopted an equitable splitting of 
take-or-pay costs.50  As FERC stated there:   
The Commission recognizes that it is difficult to assign 
blame for the pipeline industry’s take-or-pay problems.  In 
brief, no one segment of the natural gas industry or 
particular circumstance appears wholly responsible for the 																																																								39	See	generally	Richard	J.	Pierce,	Jr.,	Reconstituting	the	Natural	Gas	Industry	from	Wellhead	to	
Burnertip,	9	ENERGY	L.	J.	1	(1988).			40	Id.			
41 For discussion, see Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will the 
Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 15 ENERGY L.J. 273 (1994).   42	For	an	overview,	see	EISEN	ET	AL.,	supra	note	[31].	
43 Order 380, 49 Fed. Reg. at 22,779, 22, 282 (1984).   
44 Order 436, 50 Fed. Reg.  42,408 (1985).   
45 Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“AGD I”) 
46 Id. at 1023. 
47 Id. at 1025.   
48 Id. at 1024. 
49 Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   
50 Order 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,334 (1987).   
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pipelines’ excess inventories of gas.  As a result, all 
segments should shoulder some of the burden of resolving 
the problem.51 
In Order 500, FERC still failed to endorse full recovery of pipeline stranded costs, 
perhaps because the very existence of these take-or-pay contracts indicated that pipelines 
were aware of some risks of changing economic conditions. In Order 636, the order that 
completed FERC’s gas pipeline restructuring, FERC finally allowed pipelines to bill 
customers for 100% of their remaining stranded costs,52 though the agency was also 
careful to note that the equitable sharing approach of the past (as endorsed in Order 500) 
had been necessary to “encourage pipelines to share some of the cost of the extraordinary 
take-or-pay liabilities of the early and mid-1980s.”53  Although the D.C. Circuit had made 
it clear that FERC could not completely ignore the impact on investors of take-or-pay 
contracts during pipeline market restructuring, it bears emphasis that the agency was 
never legally obligated to provide 100% recovery for stranded costs associated with 
transitioning from regulated to competitive gas markets—even though Order 636 
ultimately took this policy position. 
The nature of the stranded costs incurred by pipelines during this transition 
differed from nuclear stranded costs.  Fuel costs are a relatively small component of the 
costs of operating a nuclear power plant, so nuclear stranded cost compensation debates 
were driven by the fixed costs of the assets.  By contrast, given how pipeline contracts 
were executed in the industry, pipelines’ claims to stranded costs were driven almost 
entirely by the volatility in gas markets.  The use of stranded cost recovery to compensate 
firms for this risk made it even more difficult for regulators to assess which risks were 
appropriate for investors, on the one hand, as opposed to consumers, on the other.  Still, 
as with nuclear power plants, stranded cost recover for take-or-pay contracts was 
approved post hoc, after these contracts were executed, so this was not a risk that pipeline 
investors were presumably compensated for in their initial return on investment.  Ex post 
stranded cost recovery helped to keep the cost of capital for approved pipeline projects 
low, while also providing investors compensation for risks of change as they 
materialized, rather than in a higher return on their initial investment.   
3. Competitive Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry 
 
A third and more recent experiment with stranded cost recovery relates to 
competitive restructuring of the electric power industry in the 1990s.  For most of the 
twentieth century, the electric utility had been regulated as a natural monopoly, but a 
range of reforms in the 1970s and 80s led to efforts to restructure the industry towards 
competitive markets, much in the manner that FERC had reformed natural gas markets.54   
 																																																								
51 Order 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,337.   
52 Order 636, 57 Fed. Fed. 13,267 (Apr. 16, 1992).   
53 Id. at 13,308.   54	See	Richard	J.	Pierce,	Jr.,	The	State	of	the	Transition	to	Competitive	Markets	in	Natural	Gas	and	
Electricity,	15	ENERGY	L.J.	323	(1994).	
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This transition revived a concern about constitutional takings of the sort that 
pepper the history of energy law,55 repackaged for this particular set of events as 
“deregulatory takings.”56  These stranded cost claims included requests to allow 
regulatory compensation for some power plant assets that were no longer considered 
valuable in competitive power markets, in a similar manner to canceled nuclear plants.57  
However, many firms’ claims to stranded cost from electric power restructuring also 
related to lost expected income given the change in regulatory rules.  Just as with gas 
pipeline stranded cost compensation, this kind of focus on income streams stranded by 
regulatory transition challenged the ability of regulators to separate ordinary business 
risks over which the firm (and its investors) have some degree of control, from regulatory 
risks associated with the transition to competitive electric power markets.58  Estimates of 
utilities’ stranded costs in the transition to competitive electric power markets ranged 
from $10 billion to $500 billion, with most estimates falling in the $100 billion to $200 
billion range.59 
 
As with nuclear power plants’ stranded cost recovery, courts were not receptive to 
legal claims that the Constitution required full compensation for all revenue lost during a 
transition to a competitive electricity market.60  However, despite a lack of any judicial 
mandate to provide for full stranded cost compensation, regulators routinely found ways 
to help mitigate the stranded cost impacts on firms and investors of the regulatory 
transition to competitive markets.  In Order 888, issued in 1996, FERC adopted an open 
access regime for wholesale electric power supply, similar to its competitive market 
approach for natural gas.61  In contrast to FERC’s initial shared cost allocation for take-
or-pay contracts,62 FERC allowed utility shareholders to recover 100% of the stranded 
costs associated with transitioning to a competitive wholesale power supply industry.63  In 
adopting retail competition plans, states such as California also allowed for full stranded 
cost recovery.64  Importantly, however, some states transitioning to competitive retail 
																																																								55	E.g.,	Duquesne	Light	Co.	v.	Barasch,	488	U.S.	299	(1989)	(takings	challenge	regarding	cost	recovery	for	canceled	nuclear	power	plants);	Fed.	Power	Comm’n	v.	Hope	Natural	Gas,	320	U.S.	591	(1944)	(takings	challenge	for	method	of	computing	cost	recovery).		
56 J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 
(1997).   57	Id.			58	Cf.	Jim	Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297, 307 (1998) (reviewing J. 
GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: 
THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997))	
59 See CBO PAPER, ELECTRIC UTILITIES:  DEREGULATION AND STRANDED COSTS 15 (Oct. 1998). 
60 As is discussed in John Burritt McArthur, The Irreconcilable Difference Between FERC’s Natural Gas 
and Electricity Stranded Cost Treatments, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 71 (1998); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim 
Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2000).   
61 Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996).   
62 McArthur, supra note 60.    
63 Id. at 93.   64	Infra	note	65.	
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power markets refused to allow for the full recovery of stranded costs or denied them 
altogether.65   
 
B. Stranded Cost Myopia 
 
These past experiments with stranded cost recovery and the tools used by 
regulators to address them share some common characteristics that contributed to a 
blinkered regulatory perspective, distorting the cost of capital to consistently favor old 
energy infrastructure over new entrants and new projects.  Importantly, they were not 
driven by judicial mandate66 so much as by political and regulatory processes that invited 
utilities (and their investors) to invest resources in lobbying for compensation for the 
stranded costs associated with industry changes, typically in the form of additional 
charges that customers would pay in their future bills.  While this approach to stranded 
cost compensation was designed to ensure that the firm would be able to continue to 
attract capital at a low cost to customers, it also served to lock in the status quo, resulting 
in delays in industry transitions, including slowing the onset of new technologies.67  The 
narrowly focused nature of these past experiments related to both the timing of stranded 
cost recovery, and a regulatory lack of appreciation for values beyond the immediate 
adverse financial impact of transitions on investors.   
 
  1. Ex Post Recovery Mechanisms 
 
As we have described, a common feature of these past experiments with stranded 
cost compensation is an appetite, on the part of both regulators and firms, for transition 
cost recovery at the back end of investment decisions. These past examples do not 
illustrate a regulatory process that makes a concerted effort to address stranded costs 
before investment decisions are made or at the time of their initial approval.  Hindsight is 
always 20/20, so such ex post recovery of stranded costs serves to avert 
acknowledgement of any past mistakes on the part of regulators or firms.  On the other 
hand, providing compensation for investment decisions gone wrong only ex post can look 
more like a form of industry bailout than traditional cost-based decisionmaking, which 
would encourage actors to price any risk of change into their initial investment decisions.  
 																																																								
65 California allowed for 100% stranded cost recovery in its retail market transition; other states, by 
contrast, provided for only partial stranded cost recovery or were outright hostile to stranded cost recovery 
claims, forcing firms to take the initiative in selling off uneconomic assets.  For discussion, see Elizabeth 
A. Nowicki, Denial of Regulatory Assistance in Stranded Cost Recovery in a Deregulated Electricity 
Industry, 32 LOY.-L.A. L. REV. 431, 442-43 (1999). 
66 See Rossi, supra note [28], at 307 (noting that since Market Street Railway v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S 
548 (1945), “courts have consistently imposed on regulated firms the risk of changing technological and 
economic circumstances.”). 
67 This, of course, was one of the concerns famously raised by the Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge 
and rejected by Chief Justice Taney’s majority, which reasoned that the loss of profit from the construction 
of a new bridge was simply irrelevant to determining the state’s contractual obligations surrounding a 
monopoly charter, especially where the public stood to benefit from new technology.  The Proprietors of 
the Charles River Bridge v. the Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 544 (1837) (noting any 
“ambiguity in the terms of the [regulatory] contract must operate against [the private company] and in favor 
of the public”).   
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These experiments show that stranded cost compensation helped to routinely 
ensure that investor risks were not ignored.  As described above, however, this practice 
could contribute to an artificially low initial cost of capital for new investments.  If 
regulators themselves were insuring against regulatory change, investors (and the firm) 
had no incentive to demand a return on investment that prices the risks of regulatory 
change in present value as new infrastructure investment decisions were made.  As 
Richard Pierce has chronicled, for example, with respect to the stranded cost problems 
associated with excess nuclear capacity, the regulatory tools used to address those 
problems exacerbated the problem, arguably encouraging rate-regulated utilities to 
overinvest in certain forms of power supply.68   
 
At the same time, energy law’s historic appetite for back-end cost recovery with 
changing circumstances systematically encouraged firms to lobby against regulatory 
change and, once changed seemed imminent, to make inflated claims for stranded cost 
recovery.  To take one example, with impending competitive restructuring of the electric 
power industry, the industry claimed that stranded costs would be in the hundreds of 
billions, and that restructuring would potentially force many utilities into bankruptcy.69 
Not every firm made substantial profits in the transition to competitive markets, but today 
it is recognized that the actual stranded costs incurred by firms were far less—closer to 
$10 billion—even though the regulatory and legislative process provided for transition 
recovery in excess of $100 billion.70  Addressing stranded costs after an investment 
decision is more likely to lead to systematic overcompensation for regulatory risk 
because of loss aversion, or the exaggerated value a firm (especially a regulated firm with 
long-lived, capital intensive assets) might place on losing revenue streams they have 
received in the past.71  Out of fear of seeing their past investments lose existing revenue, 
many energy firms and their investors routinely overstated their stranded cost losses.72  
Regulators too feared criticism for past decisions they made, and therefore were often 
complicit in approving stranded cost recovery for energy infrastructure that they 
approved or encouraged.  The expectation that regulators would provide a back-end 
bailout—as happened with excess nuclear capacity, take-or-pay-contracts, and 
competitive restructuring—encouraged firms to aggressively use the regulatory process 
to further prolong the revenue streams associated with their assets.73  
 
These experiments with stranded cost recovery also show how energy regulators 
routinely confused different kinds of risk in compensating firms for stranded costs.  Risks 
of economic and technological change were frequently lumped together in discussions of 
stranded cost recovery, perhaps because the expectation of recovery alleviated any need 																																																								
68 Pierce, Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect, supra note [12].   
69 See CBO PAPER, ELECTRIC UTILITIES:  DEREGULATION AND STRANDED COSTS 15 (Oct. 1998). 
70 Moody’s Investors Service, Special Comment, Smoke, Mirrors & Stranded Costs: How Stranded Cost 
Estimates Went from North of $130 Billion Dollars to $10 Billion, at 1 (Oct. 1999).  At the time, Moody’s 
estimated that more than $100 billion of this was already “expected to be taken care of. . . via regulatory 
and legislative processes.”  Id.   
71 Eyal Zamir, Law’s Loss Aversion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW ch. 11 (Oxford University Press 2014) (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman, eds.).   72	See	Moody’s	Investors	Service,	supra	note	70.			73	See	Rossi,	supra	note	[28];	Chen,	supra	note	[14].			
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for fine-tuning.  As stranded cost compensation shifted from focusing on a specific 
capital asset (as with nuclear power plants) to focusing on broader investor expectations 
about issues that were tied to things such as long-term contracts and fuel costs, regulatory 
risks (over which presumably firms and their investors had little or no control) became 
muddled with ordinary business risks, over which firms and their investors had some 
degree of control.  The result may have been to encourage a moral hazard problem of 
sorts, leading to overinvestment in energy infrastructure and more excess capacity:  
Utility investors could expect some compensation at the back-end not only for risks of 
regulatory change, but for routine business risks associated with changes in economic and 
technological conditions as well.74   
 
   2.  Stranded Values of Past Stranded Cost Recovery 
 
In addition to contributing to excess capacity and discouraging private pricing of 
risk, energy law’s past experiments with stranded cost recovery did a poor job of 
recognizing the private and social gains associated with transitions.  A fixation on the 
regulatory contract focused primarily on harms related to financial impacts to the firm 
and its investors. Regulators gave little consideration to “stranded benefits,” that is, the 
offsetting advantages that a transition might also present to those firms or investors that 
were claiming harm.75 For example, in the transition to competitive electric power 
markets, after restructuring, many utilities retained transmission lines that would become 
valuable new profit centers in their future operations.76 Another such benefit is the value 
older baseload power plants might provide as a reliability and price hedge when 
competitive electric power markets presented new volatilities.  Such benefits were often 
ignored or downplayed in stranded cost debates.  Indeed, there is some evidence to 
suggest that firms held back on disclosing their plans to exploit new opportunities with 
deregulation (and hence any stranded benefits) until regulators had resolved stranded cost 
compensation.77   
 
Moreover, past stranded cost experiments made almost no mention of the broader 
social costs and benefits associated with a regulatory transition, or its impact on the 
energy system.  Regulators’ focus on compensating firm-specific investor value provided 
for little serious consideration of the social costs associated with industry transitions. An 
emphasis on the financial impact of stranded investments to investors left little room for 
regulators to address other values like energy reliability or the environmental attributes of 
energy resources. Little or no attention was given to the costs imposed on others, such as 
new entrants or workers.  Given the lack of any pricing for environmental externalities, 
neither was serious attention given to the environmental impact of the utility’s investment 																																																								
74 See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 60, at 1486-89. 
75 See Reed W. Cearley & Daniel H. Cole, Stranded Benefits Versus Stranded Costs in Utility 
Deregulation, in THE ENERGY OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY:  DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE 
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (Daniel H. Cole, ed. 2003) (defining stranded benefits as a transfer from 
ratepayers to investors, as opposed to investors to ratepayers).   
76 See Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, supra note 58, at 313 (suggesting transmission and 
distribution assets as stranded benefits).   
77 See Sanjeev Bhojraj et al., Voluntary Disclosure in a Multi-Audience Setting:  An Empirical 
Investigation, 79 ACCOUNTING REV., no. 4, at 921 (Oct. 1, 2004). 
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decisions.  If an investor suffered a financial loss, a stranded cost was considered equally 
meritorious for compensation, whether it supported the operation of a polluting coal plant 
or a nuclear plant or pipeline, each of which imposes very different impacts on 
surrounding communities.78  A decision to compensate stranded costs meant that a 
resource would continue to operate into the future, but by prolonging the life of obsolete 
infrastructure without considering broader social costs and benefits, it also left many non-
economic values stranded.  In other words, looking at the financial impacts of each 
energy resource on investors and the firm in isolation for purposes of stranded cost 
compensation has blinded regulators to considering how cost recovery for particular 
sources of energy supply has broader system-wide effects on the grid, or the broaded 
balance of energy resources in the nation’s power supply portfolio. 
 
II. Decarbonization’s Impending Stranded Investment Threat  
 
Decarbonization of the grid will not come cheap.79 It stands to be one of the most 
significant economic transformations our economy has experienced in the last century. 80  
To the extent that the stranded costs associated with the transition to decarbonization 
have never been addressed, this threatens to slow any change, contributing to carbon 
lock-in in the energy sector81 and discouraging new investment dollars from flowing to 
new decarbonized energy infrastructure. As these transitions occur, we can predict that 
industry (and its investors) will continue to show a reluctance to retire any assets that 
have remaining useful life, regardless of their environmental attributes or whether those 
investments are stranded because of regulatory change, market forces, or technological 
innovation.  We can expect these firms to aggressively seek ex post compensation.  We 
also can expect incumbent firms to couch the potential for financial losses with the 
transition in stranded investment terms, inviting the regulatory process to leave important 
other values stranded.   
 
Changes to infrastructure are already beginning to happen, leading to these kinds 
of claims for stranded cost compensation.  This observation is perhaps most salient for 
existing coal plants, many of which are expected to be phased out of operation with the 																																																								
78 In part, this was because energy law was considered to be a separate paradigm, entirely separate and 
distinct from environmental law.  For discussion, see Todd S. Aagaard, Energy-Environment Policy 
Alignments, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1517 (2015).   79	The	costs	of	a	failure	to	achieve	decarbonization,	however,	may	be	far	greater.	See	Zero	Zone,	Inc.	v.	Dep’t	of	Energy,		Nos.	14-2147,	14-2159	&	14-2334,	2016	WL	4177217,	at	*16	(7th	Cir.	Aug.	8,	2016)	(refusing	to	hold	arbitrary	and	capricious	a	DOE	cost-benefit	analysis	that	included	the	social	cost	of	carbon).	
80 All of the deep carbonization scenarios see a decline in traditional fossil fuel plant investment of $10 
billion. Taking the “mixed” scenario as a starting point, increases in annual electricity generation 
investments would need to increase $15 billion per year from 2021-30 and over $30 billion per year from 
2031-2040.  By 2050, the electricity sector would need more than $50 billion per year of incremental 
investment in electricity generation.  A “high renewables” case would require more than $70 billion per 
year of new generation investments by 2050.  JAMES H. WILLIAMS, ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP 
CARBONIZATION IN THE U.S. 47 (2014), at http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/US-Deep-
Decarbonization-Report.pdf. 81	For	a	description	of	carbon	lock-in,	see	supra	note	7.	(referencing	Unruh)			
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regulation of carbon emissions, as well as existing nuclear plants.82  No doubt, some 
existing infrastructure will no longer be considered valuable as new environmental 
regulations come into effect and energy markets begin to price carbon emissions into 
investment decisions.  Many existing assets will need to be retired to make room for more 
efficient and less polluting sources of energy, leading to a major shift in investment in the 
industry.  Equally important, we maintain, is that new investment must simultaneously be 
pursued to allow decarbonization to succeed—which might include a massive investment 
in new-generation nuclear plants, combined-cycle natural gas plants, large-scale new 
solar and wind projects, and the transportation infrastructure such as pipelines and 
transmission lines that will interconnect these resources.  The transition to 
decarbonization shows how stranded cost issues are not unique to old resources, but will 
be increasingly important for new investments.  We highlight here the stranded 
investment issues decarbonization presents for some of these resources, which are already 
giving rise to new pleas for stranded cost compensation by incumbent firms in the 
industry.  We focus on fossil fuel power plants, nuclear power plants, and energy 
transportation infrastructure.  
 
A. Fossil Fuel Power Plants 
 
Coal and natural gas power plants account for more than 60% of the grid’s energy 
supply portfolio.83  Many of these plants have already been in operation for decades.  
Given the high fixed costs that have been paid to build and keep these plants in operation, 
firms face strong incentives to keep them in operation as long as they produce positive 
revenue streams from energy sales.  The marginal costs to the firm of using these plants 
to produce energy can be very low, depending on the price of the fuel they use to produce 
the next unit of energy.84  The impact of the carbon transition on these “legacy” fossil fuel 
plants presents one of the most significant stranded cost barriers to the decarbonization 
transition. 
 
  Coal-fired power is the obvious loser in the transition to a low-carbon future.85 
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) expressly contemplates a phase-out of existing coal—to be 
replaced in the short term by increased utilization of natural gas combined cycle (NGCC), 																																																								82	See	Coal	is	Going,	Going,	Gone?,	UTILITY	DIVE	BLOG,	April	24,	2014,	at	http://www.utilitydive.com/news/coal-is-going-going-gone/253641/	(discussing	EIA’s	predictions	of	the	retirement	of	a	significant	number	of	coal-based	power	plants,	along	with	a	growth	in	natural	gas	power	generation);	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	>>	(discussing	challenges	for	nuclear	power	plants).			
83 See What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Source, at 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3. 84	For	an	overview,	see	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	>>,	at	156-63	(providing	comparative	cost	profiles	of	various	electricity	fuels).	
85 Hammond & Pierce, supra note >>, at 2. Of course, if carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) becomes a 
viable technology, there may yet be a role for coal. EPA’s carbon emission rule for new power plants 
requires at least some use of this technology. Standards	of	Performance	for	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	from	New,	Modified,	and	Reconstructed	Stationary	Sources:	Electric	Utility	Generating	Units,	80	Fed.	Reg.	64,509,	64,512-13	(Oct.	23,	2015)	[hereinafter,	“GHG	New	Source	Standards”].. 
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and ultimately by increased new renewables penetration.86 Moreover, other Clean Air Act 
(CAA) mandates—including the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule87 and the Utility MACT 
Rule88—have put pressure on coal-fired power in recent years, increasing both the capital 
and operating costs associated with such plants.89 These are regulatory changes, but they 
should not be a surprise. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments directed EPA to address 
both cross-state air quality issues for criteria pollutants and toxic emissions from the 
power sector.90 And although greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation under the CAA may have 
come as a surprise to some,91 the power sector’s role in climate change has long been 
recognized.92 At the very least, serious conversations about mitigation in the United 
States are nearing a decade old. 
 
Market forces have also put pressure on coal.  Natural gas has stepped in as a 
baseload competitor; its low prices have made it attractive to investors funding new 
power plants, and have also contributed to low short-run marginal costs, making it a hard 
competitor to beat on the competitive wholesale markets.93 In fact, in its rule for new 
sources of carbon dioxide emissions in the electricity sector, EPA justified its strict 
approach for coal-fired power partly by explaining that very little new coal will be built 
anyway given these market forces.94 
 
																																																								
86 For an early look at the projected future electricity fuel mix under the CPP, see Energy Info. Admin., 
Annual Energy Outlook 2016, Effects of the Clean Power Plan (June 20, 2016), at 
https://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/section_issues.cfm#cpp.  
87 Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction 
of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011); see EPA v. EME Homer Generation, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1584 (2014) (upholding CSAPR). 
88 The MACT Rule was held unlawful in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); however, the Rule 
remained in effect and EPA has now issued a supplemental finding meant to address the deficiencies. 
Supplemental Finding that It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From 
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electricity Generating Steam Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016).  Some coal 
companies actually argued against a stay because they had already convinced their state PUCs to permit 
them to recover the costs for new pollution control equipment. 
89 See EIA, AEO 2016, supra note >>, at 27 (attributing most coal retirements to these two rules); Neil 
Copeland & Debashis Bose, BLACK & VEATCH, Impact of Coal Plant Retirements on the Capacity and 
Energy Market in PJM 1 (2012) (describing 28 GW of coal-powered capacity slated to retire by 2020, 
partly due to CSAPR and MACT rules), at http://bv.com/docs/reports-studies/impact-of-coal-plant-
requirements-on-the-capacity-energy-market-in-pjm.pdf. 90	See	Michigan	v.	EPA,	135	S.	Ct.	2699,	2704-96	(2015)	(describing	1990	amendments	for	hazardous	air	pollutants);	Clean	Air	Act	Amendments	of	1990	Summary,	available	online	at	https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-act-amendment-summary	
91 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).   
92 See Stephen Ferrey, International Power on “Power,” 45 ENVTL. L. 1063 (1063) (describing history of 
efforts to use renewable electricity rather than fossil-fueled electricity for climate change mitigation 
purposes). 
93 See Hammond & Spence, supra note [22], at 158-63 (describing comparative cost data and 
considerations for various electricity fuels); see also EIA, Electric Power Monthly, Tbl. 1.1, Net Generation 
By Energy Source: Total (All Sources), 2006-March 2016 (May 25, 2016) (presenting power generation 
figures showing increasing contributions of natural gas to power generation, culminating with its 
generating approximately the same amount of power as coal in 2015). 
94 GHG New Source Standards, supra note 85, at 64, 513-14. 
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The result is that coal-fired power plants are closing, coal companies are going 
bankrupt,95 and coal’s share of power generation is expected to decrease from well over 
half in the 1990s and early 2000s to about 18% by 2040.96 Despite these negative results 
for coal companies and coal-industry workers, there are significant carbon and other air-
quality benefits to be gained by weaning ourselves from coal.97 But it is also true that 
there are social costs associated with closing these plants. In parts of the country where 
natural gas pipeline capacity is lacking—for example, the northeast during winter’s high 
demand—coal provides the security of reliability because the fuel itself is easily stored.98 
Furthermore, the economies of coal-producing states like West Virginia are heavily 
dependent on the resource.  As just one metric, tens of thousands of jobs have been lost in 
the the coal industry in recent years..99 
 
As coal’s share of the electricity supply wanes, natural gas’s share is growing. In 
many states today, almost all of the new power plant capacity coming online is natural 
gas. The use of natural gas to produce electricity is expected to continue to increase in the 
near future, given its abundant supply, low costs relative to other fuel sources, and lower 
carbon impacts compared to other fossil fuels.100   In contrast to older baseload coal 
plants, natural gas plants are usually built as peaking resources (i.e., those that are 
primarily deployed to meet peak customer loads) and offer many efficiencies as load 
following resources that can complement the integration of variable resources such as 
wind and solar into the grid.101   
 
Yet one lurking concern is overinvestment in natural gas power plants for 
purposes of power supply, which could readily lead to overreliance on the fuel as a 
generation resource.  For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists has warned that 
many states’ heavy short-term reliance on natural gas plants presents a long-term risk of 
locking in investments in power plants that could peak in use by 2030, potentially 
creating massive new excess capacity problems.102  Concerns with the grid’s future 
overreliance on natural gas are heightened by the need for increased decarbonization over 
the coming decades, as natural gas is not carbon-free; as some scholars have argued, 
meeting our climate policy goals will require “eliminating virtually all” of our natural gas 																																																								
95 Charles Riley & Chris Isidore, The largest U.S. coal company just filed for bankruptcy, CNN MONEY 
(Apr. 13, 2016) (describing bankruptcy filings of Peabody Energy and Arch Coal). 
96 EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 EARLY RELEASE: ANNOTATED SUMMARY OF TWO CASES 22 (May 
17, 2016). 
97 See Hammond & Spence, supra note [22], at 172-73 (describing these issues and collecting sources). 
98 Id. at 165. 
99 Drew Haerer & Lincoln Pratson, Employment trends in the U.S. electricity sector, 2008-2012, 82 
ENERGY POL’Y 85 (2015) (estimating loss of over 49,000 coal jobs during study period); Kris Maher & Dan 
Frosch, Coal Downturn Hammers Budgets in West Virginia and Wyoming, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2015), at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/coal-downturn-hammers-budgets-in-west-virginia-and-wyoming-1450822015. 
100 EIA projects significant additions of natural gas capacity, whether or not the CPP remains in place. EIA, 
Annual Energy Outlook 2016, Early Release: Annotated Summary of Two Cases 22 (May 17, 2016). 101	See	Natural	Gas	Fired	Combustion	Turbines	Are	Generally	Use	to	Meet	Peak	Electricity	Load,	available	online	at	http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13191.	
102 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, RATING THE STATES ON THEIR RISK OF NATURAL GAS 
OVERRELIANCE (October 2015), online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/12/natural-
gas-overreliance-analysis-document.pdf. 
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use by 2050.103 The prospect of future stranded costs for natural gas, akin to what is 
currently being claimed in the coal industry, seems highly likely a decade or two into the 
decarbonization transition.104  
 
  B.  Nuclear Power Plants 
 
Nuclear power represents approximately 20% of the nation’s power supply 
portfolio.105  However, many existing plants are facing early retirement, largely as a result 
of the competitive electricity markets’ failure to value carbon.106 But decarbonization 
scenarios anticipate that nuclear power, which has no carbon emissions, will need to 
increase and new plants will need to be built.107  This makes nuclear plants a significant 
potential stranded cost issue for the decarbonization transition as well.   
 
Like coal, nuclear power provides steady, reliable baseload electricity with a 
fueling schedule that insulates it from the pipeline capacity issues that can plague natural 
gas.108 Unlike coal and natural gas, nuclear power does not emit criteria pollutants, toxics, 
or greenhouse gases.109 Thus, it has not been subject to the same CAA regulatory 
pressures as coal in recent years—though it has always been a highly regulated 
industry.110 Nevertheless, nuclear power is struggling on the competitive wholesale 
markets; several plants have begun the decommissioning process, and others are currently 
listed as marginal.111 The reasons relate to the dynamics of imperfect competitive 
markets. Because nuclear power must always run, it is a price-taker, meaning it will take 
whatever clearing price the wholesale markets provide regardless of its actual short-run 
marginal or long-run average costs.112 Low natural gas prices and increasing renewables 
penetration have contributed to lower market clearing prices.113 And without a price on 
carbon, the market is imperfect, making it harder for nuclear power to compete given its 
significant continued operational and safety costs.114 
 
Nuclear power plants operating outside of the competitive wholesale markets 
have not encountered these challenges. In fact, the most prominent new reactors under 																																																								
103 Weissman, supra note [3], at 8. 
104 See also Hammond & Pierce, supra note >>, at 14-15 (describing features of the CPP that may make 
natural gas plants an increasingly high-risk investment). 
105 See EIA, supra note >>.   106	See	generally	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	[22]	(providing	detailed	diagnosis).	
107 See, e.g., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note [1]. 
108 Hammond & Spence, supra note [22], at 165. 
109 Natural gas emits fewer of these pollutants than coal. Id. at 167. For a full discussion of the comparative 
environmental externalities of the various electricity fuel sources, see id. at 166-68. 
110 See Hammond & Spence, supra note [22], at 173-90 (arguing this level of regulation has caused nuclear 
power to internalize costs that are externalities for competitor fuel sources, putting it at a comparative 
economic disadvantage).  
111 See generally id. 
112 Id. at 189-90. 
113 Id.  
114 See, e.g., MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER (2003 & 2009 update), 
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ (illustrating cost competitiveness of nuclear power were carbon fully 
valued).  
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construction are in Georgia and South Carolina,115 where the regulatory contract 
continues to provide cost recovery through ratemaking and can further be used to hedge 
future uncertainties.116 Thus, whether a nuclear reactor is at risk of becoming a stranded 
asset may well depend on the restructuring status of its jurisdiction.117 
 
From the perspective of a post-carbon grid, the position of nuclear reactors raises 
important stranded-cost issues—albeit issues that present different stakes than existing 
coal plants. Consider that existing reactors contribute over 60% of the nation’s carbon-
free electricity,118 and when reactors are shut down, carbon emissions increase.119 
Achieving carbon emission reduction goals will require continued reliance on existing 
nuclear plants, as well as substantial new investment in nuclear plants.120 The Clean 
Power Plan (CPP)121 does not afford credit to states that retain existing nuclear power, but 
it does give credit for plant uprates and new reactors.122 Further, the CPP contemplates 
that credit trading may be the easiest path to compliance.123  Marginal plants thus face a 
temporal gap: at the moment—before the CPP has taken effect and while there is no real 
price on carbon—these plants could be considered stranded assets. But in the next 
decade, it is likely that their value from a carbon perspective will increase—whether from 
the CPP or some other climate change mitigation policy. New York, for example, has 
taken the policy view that nuclear power should help bridge today’s carbon-heavy 
electric sector to the low-carbon grid of the future.124 The stranded cost question is 
whether—and if so, how—to support these plants while we await regulatory and market 
dynamics that value their carbon contribution. 																																																								
115 See id. at 188 (describing regulatory circumstances leading to new construction). As of this writing, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was conducting power ascension testing on the new Watts Bar Unit 2 
reactor, which was licensed under an older procedural framework but was only recently completed. It is 
expected to begin commercial operation in summer 2016. See TVA, Power Ascension Testing, at 
https://www.tva.gov/Newsroom/Watts-Bar-2-Project (last visited June 8, 2016) (providing updates). 
116 See infra Part II >> (discussing these states’ approaches to cost recovery for the carrying costs of 
construction). 
117 As is described infra Part III., the jurisdiction’s restructuring status may also bear on states’ options for 
addressing stranded cost issues. 
118 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATE HISTORICAL TABLES FOR 2014 (rev. Nov. 2015). 
119 For sources regarding the closure of the Vermont Yankee power plant in Vermont, see Patricio Silva, 
ISO NEW ENGLAND, Environmental Update, Planning Advisory Committee, at 17 (Feb. 17, 2016); William 
Opalka, CO2 Emissions Increase in ISO-NE; Loss of Nuclear Plant Reverses Trend, RTO INSIDER (Feb. 22, 
2016). For sources regarding the closure of the San Onofre power plant in California, see Cal. Air 
Resources Bd., 2014 Edition: California GHG Emission Inventory 4 (May 13, 2014). For experience in 
Japan following the moratorium on nuclear power following Fukushima, see Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, Gov’t of Japan, Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook 4 (July 15, 2015). 
120 See PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supra note [1].   
121 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter CCP] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The 
Supreme Court stayed the CPP during the pendency of litigation, which as of this writing is scheduled for 
oral argument before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15A793 (U.S. Feb. 9, 
2016). 
122 CPP, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,823. 
123 See id. at 64,823; Proposed Rule, Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From 
Electric Utility Generation Units Constructed On or Before January 8, 2014, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,966, 64,968 
(Oct. 23, 2015). 
124 See sources collected supra note 16.   
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C. Energy Transportation  
 
Energy transportation is also not exempt from stranded-cost issues with 
impending decarbonization.  As noted above, construction of natural gas-fired power 
plants is projected to increase over the next decade or so. Yet natural gas-fired electricity 
requires not just power plants, but a transportation infrastructure. This necessity presents 
even trickier future excess capacity problems that relate to gas production as well as 
power plants.  
 
Currently, there are a number of mismatches between the electricity and natural 
gas markets. Among the issues is pipeline capacity: natural gas is sold on spot markets, 
and the prices in recent times are significantly below their historically averages125 Electric 
power suppliers buy natural gas on those spot markets, obtaining even lower prices by 
taking interruptible service.126 Without long-term contracts, investors are reluctant to take 
on the significant financial commitment needed to construct new natural gas pipelines.127 
Paradoxically, natural gas is flared in some regions due to lack of pipeline 
infrastructure128 even while there are shortages in other regions in the winter months 
when natural gas is in demand for both heating and electricity generation.129  This lack of 
pipeline infrastructure has already created some stranded costs. In some areas of the 
country, for example, natural gas wells have been drilled but not completed due to the 
lack of transportation to get natural gas to market.130 
 
The CPP’s goals for carbon emission reduction contemplate that NGCC 
utilization in the nation’s power supply portfolio—currently somewhere around 40%—
could increase to as high as 75% to replace coal-fired generation.131 Regional 
transmission organization such as PJM and MISO both contemplate that achieving this 
increased utilization would require major new pipeline infrastructure,132 and the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has warned that significant pipeline 
investment is needed to avoid reliability issues.133 This presents another stranded-cost 
issue: will investors want to build this new infrastructure, knowing that the ultimate goal 																																																								125	See	Taking	a	Look	at	Historical	Natural	Gas	Prices	(Jan.	25,	2015),	available	online	at	http://seekingalpha.com/article/2830226-taking-a-look-at-historical-natural-gas-prices	
126 See Hammond & Spence, supra note [22], at 165 & n.115 (collecting sources). 
127 For a full exploration of the contributing factors to a lack of pipeline capacity, see generally Alexandra 
B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L 
REV. 947 (2015).  
128 The most notorious example involves flaring in North Dakota’s Bakken field. Id. at 1009-15. 
129 FERC, WINTER 2013-2014 OPERATIONS AND MARKET PERFORMANCE IN RTOS AND ISOS 8 (Apr. 1, 
2014), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2014/04-01-14.pdf (describing significant electricity 
generation outages during polar vortex due to gas curtailment, lack of fuel diversity, and frozen coal).  
130 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note >>, at 1005.   
131 CPP, at 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,802-03.  
132 To nudge investors toward firm natural gas contracts, PJM has adopted new capacity market rules with 
significant penalties for generators that cannot dispatch when called. See Order Denying Request for 
Clarification, Granting in Part Request for Rehearing, 152 FERC P 61,064 (July 22, 2015); Order on 
Proposed Tariff Revisions, 151 FERC P 61,208 (June 9, 2015). 
133 NERC, Potential Reliability Impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan 24-25 (Nov. 2014). 
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of the electricity sector is to wean ourselves from natural gas as well as coal? Keep in 
mind as well that once that infrastructure is in place, there will be a new path 
dependency: stranded-cost concerns could mean reliance on natural-gas fired power 
longer than would be optimal from a climate change mitigation perspective.134  New 
electricity transmission infrastructure presents similar stranded cost challenges:  On one 
hand, regulatory certainty is necessary to attract capital investments to build transmission 
lines in new locations for the decarbonized grid.  On the other hand, it is important that 
new transmission lines do not help to prolong the asset life of older fossil fuel generation 
power plants that would otherwise be retired – thus exasperating the carbon legacy plant 
problem highlighted above.135   
 
III. Stranded Cost Compensation for Grid Decarbonization 
 
These examples point to the almost intractable problem presented by irreversible 
energy infrastructure investment decisions and the path dependencies they create—an 
especially salient challenge given the transition to a significantly debarbonized energy 
grid.  History shows how energy law is consistently inept at retiring energy infrastructure 
with any remaining life, though there are occasional counter-examples related to the 
decommissioning of specific hydroelectric and nuclear facilities.136   With new stranded 
cost issues already occurring or predictable in the near future, we turn now to how such 
costs might best be handled as we transition to a decarbonized energy grid.   
 
This Part first discusses whether, given structural changes the energy industry has 
undergone in recent decades, regulators today might be more justified than ever in 
ignoring stranded cost issues, including those associated with decarbonization’s 
transition.  But although these structural changes provide great promise for future private 
management of many investor risks, stranded cost compensation during the transition to 
deep carbonization may yet prove necessary. Still, regulators should not follow the model 
of past stranded cost experiments.  Instead, in making decisions today about our future 
energy infrastructure, regulators have an opportunity to write a new stranded cost chapter 
for energy law, one that both facilitates the transition to decarbonization while providing 
a better balance between certainty and flexibility than in the past.  Front-end stranded 
cost recovery for incremental energy infrastructure investment decisions can attract new 
capital for decarbonization by reducing uncertainty, while also ensuring that values 
associated with energy reliability and carbon impacts are not left stranded during the 
impending transition.  In order to avoid distorting returns on investment to favor carbon 
lock-in, regulators must address stranded costs associated with existing energy 																																																								
134 Of course, some argue that this is already true. This Article focuses on use of natural gas as a bridge fuel 
for electric power generation, as contemplated by the CPP. See Hammond & Pierce, supra note [22], at 14-
15 (hypothesizing that expected future shifts away from natural gas may drive up prices in the near-term 
because of investor reluctance). 
135 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009).   
136 With both of these examples, federal regulators played a significant regulatory role in 
decommissioning—a role that is not available for existing fossil fuel generation plants.  See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. 
Pt. 20 Subpart E (NRC regulations governing nuclear power plant decommissioning); FPL Energy Maine 
Hydro, LLC, 107 FERC P 61,120 (May 6, 2004) (ordering surrender of hydro license and partial dam 
removal, with licensee’s agreement).  
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infrastructure under the same principles that they apply to incentives designed to reduce 
uncertainty in the investment in new resources.   
 
A. The Promise of Private Management of Stranded Costs 
 
William Baumol and J. Greogory Sidak once predicted that the “new mode of 
mixed competition and regulation” is one “in which no such problem [of stranded costs] 
need arise again.”137  Compared to fifty years ago, private investors today are much better 
equipped to address the risks of many energy transitions.  The regulatory contract that 
once described the industry can no longer be understood as a deal between a few firms 
and the state.138   Shifts towards competitive energy markets have created a regulatory 
environment that is much more multi-faceted in nature, with a range of firms, interest 
groups, and stakeholders now serving as the main participants in any regulatory 
bargain.139  Energy regulation today is not understood as a binding bilateral deal subject 
to renegotiation each time a major new infrastructure decision is made, but is much more 
fluid and ongoing in nature.140   
 
If FERC’s competitive restructuring of wholesale gas and electric power markets 
had been effective in making the energy sector perfectly competitive, then no firm or 
investor in the energy industry today would face fundamentally different risks than any 
other business.  Order 888 made clear FERC’s preference for a market competition policy 
based on open access, but we should be careful not to overstate either the scope or 
success of competitive energy markets.141  FERC’s competitive restructuring efforts 
addressed only the wholesale side of domestic energy markets, and even today, that 
restructuring process is incomplete.142  State regulators retain significant control over 
infrastructure related to retail gas and electric power sales, with most states continuing to 
apply traditional cost-based regulation to infrastructure decisions regarding these 
transactions.143  
 
Even though the rules of the game for energy markets continue to evolve, it is 
undeniable that some structural changes have created the potential for better private 
management of business risks by firms and their investors.  Under the traditional 
regulatory contract, firms and their investors were much more homogenous, with most 
regulation aimed at the traditional, vertically integrated utility.  Today, the energy 
industry is comprised of a much more diverse range of investors operating outside of 
regulatory compact.144  Most new power generation today, for example, is non-utility 
																																																								
137 Baumol & Sidak, Stranded Costs, supra note [14], at 839.  
138 Hammond & Spence, supra note [22], at 192. 
139 Id. at 192-93. 
140 See JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW (2005).   
141 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 490 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005) (contrasting promise and realities of restructuring the electricity markets). 
142 Id. at 460-61. 143	Id.		
144 Cf. Richard F. Hirsch & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Technological Systems and Momentum Changes: 
American Electric Utilities, Restructuring and Distributed Generations Technologies, 36 J. TECHNOLOGY 
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generation—plants built by firms with whom no traditional regulatory compact can be 
said to exist.145   
 
In addition, with a greater range of firms operating in the industry, private 
investors are better equipped to diversify risks themselves.  For example, with the decline 
of the traditional utility’s dominance in the electric power industry, today firms operating 
in national markets are better equipped to diversify their investments across jurisdictions 
and regions of the country.146  Also, in part due to technological innovations, the scale of 
new energy supply investments is far smaller than the kinds of large-scale base load 
plants that were characteristic of new investments in the 1960s and 1970s.147  This has 
allowed for multiple, smaller-scale investments by larger firms that are better able to 
diversify the assets on their balance sheets than utilities in the past.148  For example, many 
firms with power plants that they consider to be uneconomic seek to securitize or sell 
these assets by selling them (or spinning them off), 149 instead of asking regulators for 
stranded cost recovery.  
 
In addition, in recent decades financial regulation has improved the quality of 
information about investments that is available to investors in energy firms.  Corporate 
disclosure expectations today are much more cognizant of potential changes in business 
and technological conditions as well as regulatory regimes.150  One example is the 
historical popularity of many utility stocks as low-risk investment vehicles in worker 
pensions.  Historically, pension managers may not have been required to disclose the full 
risks of these investments, but institutional disclosure requirements for investment 
managers have changed significantly.151  Historical utility accounting practices, which 
were premised on rate recovery of asset costs, may have understated risks associated with 
long-term capital investments against the backdrop of changing conditions—a risk that 
firms today must disclose.  Increasingly too, regulators are moving towards the disclosure 
of future risks associated with climate change, and this should better enable investors to 
price these risks in making future investment decisions.152  There is some evidence to 																																																																																																																																																																					
STUD. 72, 78 (2006) (describing a new diversity of stakeholders negotiating towards a new electric power 
industry consensus). 
145 See EIA, Electric Power Monthly (showing planned near-term capacity additions) (May 2016). 
146 For terrific general overviews of these structural changes, see STEVE ISSER , ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES:  MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE 
PRESENT (2015); RICHARD F. HIRSCH, POWER LOFSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999). 
147 Remarks of Jeff Riles, Jr., Director, Regulatory Affairs, Enel Green Power North America, Inc, at GW 
Law J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Environmental Law Symposium, Mar. 11, 2016 (notes on file with 
authors). 
148 See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, POWER GENERATION INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS 14 
(2003), at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Fraser.gen.invest.elec.mkts.1203.pdf. 
149 These were commonly used strategies for addressing the stranded costs associated with electric power 
industry restructuring.  See ISSER, supra note >>, at 200-03.  
150 See, e.g., David Ruder et al., The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Pre- and Post-Enron Response 
to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103 (2005).   
151 Id. 
152 See Rick E. Hanson, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the SEC’s 2010 
Interpretive Release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487 (2012) (discussing SEC rules requiring 
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suggest that disclosure may encourage firms to do little more than reassure investors,153 
but at the very minimum investors today in the energy sectors are better informed about 
risks than investors half a century ago.   
 
These changes in the nature of regulation, industry structure, and risk disclosure 
may not make concerns about transition costs irrelevant. But we would expect private 
investors to be much better equipped to deal with transitions, especially where they 
involve business assumptions or technology decisions over which investors are able to 
assume risks themselves, or over which the firm has some degree of control. After all, the 
history of energy regulation shows that transition is the only certainty, so we should not 
allow new investors to claim surprise for the kinds of business risks that they can 
control.154  
 
 Consider again the fuel costs that drove the stranded cost problem with pipelines’ 
take-or-pay contracts.  Today, a pipeline operating on a national scale would be well 
positioned to address the risks of changes on its own, and to hedge its take-or-pay 
contracts with other instruments.  Such developments point to modern investors being 
much better equipped than in the past to address the stranded cost problem in making 
their own risk decisions, particularly to the extent that stranded costs issues reflect 
nothing more than ordinary business risks.  Of course, we can still expect that the sheer 
size of many energy infrastructure investments—along with their long-lived asset life—
will produce more significant transition cost problems down the road than are faced by 
most sectors of the economy, but that should not deter regulators from encouraging 
private investors to act on their own to price the risks of changes at the front end, where 
they can do so.   
 
B. Complementary Stranded Cost Recovery Mechanisms 
 
Given the many private mechanisms for managing the risk of stranded costs, one 
might argue that regulatory approaches for stranded cost recovery going forward are 
either unnecessary or poor public policy because they create disincentives to address the 
issue in the marketplace.  No doubt, the regulatory process can do a better job of 
encouraging investors to price risks themselves, especially the business risks of future 
economic or technology changes.  Encouraging investors to price these kinds of risks at 
the time they make a decision to invest in assets could help to shift such risk to investors, 
allowing regulators to focus on pricing those risks and transition costs over which they 
have a comparative advantage, namely, the residual risk of unexpected regulatory change 
or other values that are not represented in the competitive market.   
 																																																																																																																																																																					
disclosure of climate change risks); see also Sey-Hyo Lee & Maruskha Bland, Carbon Transparency, 
FORTNIGHTLY, May 1, 2008, at 16 
153 See, e.g., James Coleman, How Cheap is Corporate Talk?  Comparing Companies’ Comments on 
Regulations With Their Securities Disclosures, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 47 (2016) (describing how oil 
companies told federal regulators that a renewable fuel standard would harm them financially while 
simultaneously telling investors that they are well positioned to comply with any new requirements).   
154 See, e.g., Charles River Bridge, discussed supra at Part I.A. 
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The regulatory bargain in energy markets remains much more of a moving target 
than in most other sectors of the economy.  Existing energy infrastructure may be more 
capital-intensive and long-lived than the assets in other sectors of the economy, but even 
in other sectors it is recognized how important it is for regulators to be attentive to the 
transition costs associated with regulatory change.155  Changes in the energy industry in 
recent decades thus do not render stranded costs concerns irrelevant, but provide energy 
regulators an opportunity to give stranded cost recovery a new focus, better aligning 
investor signals with core public values.  We believe that stranded cost compensation 
with the decarbonization transition presents some unique opportunities for regulatory 
reform that can avoid stranded cost myopia, especially to the extent that prices and 
investment signals in competitive energy markets fail to value reliability and 
environmental attributes of energy resources. 
 
To begin, consider the massive levels of infrastructure investment that will be 
required to meet the goals of decarbonization.  Keeping warming under 2 degrees Celsius 
is estimated to require hundreds of billions of dollars of new capital investment over the 
coming decades.156  Presumably, many of these new energy infrastructure investments 
will be pursued because of their carbon emissions advantage over existing energy supply 
resources.  Unless the carbon attributes of energy supply are somehow priced in all 
market decisions concerning these resources, however, the returns that firms offer to 
investors may be too low to attract new investments, leading to underinvestment in new 
resources and overdependence on old ones.  In addition, uncertainties and high costs 
surrounding new resources such as next-generation nuclear plants, offshore wind, and 
electric power transmission have frightened investors from sinking capital into such 
projects.  To make new technological investments attractive, and to achieve the right 
balance of energy resources for decarbonization, the returns offered to investors must 
provide some premium for uncertainty while also pricing the carbon attributes and other 
values that are important to the energy system.  As is discussed above, traditional 
stranded cost compensation gave little or no discussion to these forms of stranded 
benefits in the calculated of stranded costs.  Regulators paying attention to stranded costs 
recovery as a mechanism for reducing uncertainty and addressing these values ex ante – 
i.e., before each energy resource investment decision is made – may better facilitate a 
transition to decarbonization that is attentive to the balance of resources in the energy 
system as a whole.  By avoiding wasteful ex post lobbying to address stranded costs 
decades from now, it also could help to reduce the overall cost of capital for a 
decarbonized energy system.   
 
But approaching stranded costs only as a way of incentivizing investors to steer 
capital to new decarbonized energy resources could also also be counterproductive.  The 																																																								
155 See Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change & Optimal Transition Relief, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1582 (2011) (discussing transition problems with grandfathering pollution from old 
power plants).  See also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 
(1986); Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 
37 (2008).  
156 See PATHWAYS TO DEEP CARBONIZATION, supra note >>, at 47 (noting the need for an increase in new 
investments in the range of $15-70 billion annually between today and 2050).   
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transition to decarbonization is plagued by an old resource problem too, which if left 
unaddressed can readily reinforce carbon lock-in.157  It is thus imperative to recognize the 
challenge of addressing both new and old capital investment with the transition to 
decarbonized energy infrastructrure.  Subjecting old energy infrastructure to a different 
stranded cost recovery than the principles used to incentivize investments in new 
infrastructure risks distorting investor returns to favor carbon-lock by delaying new 
investments.    
 
With respect to existing investments, such as those discussed in Part II, stranded 
cost recovery will remain important to ensuring that the transition to decarbonization 
occurs in a timely manner, and is not delayed further by path dependency.  While we are 
not proposing a bailout of all existing assets, a failure to address stranded costs 
concerning decarbonization of existing energy supply resources risks the possibility that 
some transitions may never occur. Past experience has shown that some stranded cost 
recovery might be a worthwhile price to pay for industry cooperation or even stakeholder 
buy-in in the midst of a transition.158 Equally important in addressing stranded costs for 
existing resources, however, regulators must be attentive to some important issues that 
they have ignored in the past, or they will fail to address the social costs of transitions.  
Specifically, as with new energy infrastructure, the transition issues presented by existing 
resources underscores the importance of recognizing attributes of different energy 
resources that competitive energy markets today do not value in their pricing mechanisms 
in calculating stranded costs.   
 
Before we proceed, we emphasize that our argument is pragmatic: we are not 
contending that any one kind of stranded cost recovery is the most economically efficient 
regulatory approach,159 or that it is required as a matter of contract or the Constitution.160 
Instead, the regulatory approach we propose can provide forms of stranded cost recovery 
that are politically expedient, reasonably justifiable, and useful for easing the transition to 
a clean energy future. 
 
1. Temporal Approaches and Considerations 
 
As our historical examples show, energy law has traditionally dealt with stranded 
costs for investors and firms once they arise, often long after initial private investment 
decisions are made. This ex post form of stranded cost recovery contributes to some 																																																								
157 Unruh, supra note >>.  
158 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Can the FERC Overcome Special Interest Politics?, 133 No 19 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 
31, 33 (1995) (describing FERC’s carrot/stick approach to minimizing special interest resistance to 
electricity restructuring); see also Richard J. Pierce, The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 
SUM. NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV’T 53, 83 (1995) (describing how transition from regulatory contract to 
regulated market creates stranded costs, incentivizing industry to stall). 
159 The focus of this Article is on whether and how stranded cost recovery should be allowed by regulators, 
and what core values it should reflect.  It does not address the actual financial calculation of stranded costs. 
For discussion of various methods of calculating actually stranded costs, see CBO REPORT ON 
DEREGULATION AND STRANDED COSTS, supra note [62]; SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note [59], at 394-96; 
Ajay Gupa, Tracking Stranded Costs, 21 ENERGY L.J. 113 (2000). 
160 Cf. Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, supra note [61].  
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problematic behaviors in the regulatory process, by encouraging firms and their investors 
to lobby against change, as well as discouraging firms and regulators from being attentive 
to stranded benefits and to the public values that need to be protected in transitioning to a 
new normal.161  It should not come as a surprise that the past forms of stranded cost 
compensation produced by this kind of regulatory process have appeared to be little more 
than a bribe to buy industry acquiescence in energy sector changes or, worse yet, a 
bailout that comes at the cost of consumers. If the history of energy law teaches anything, 
however, it is that transitions and change ought to be expected in the energy sector. It 
follows that regulatory approaches that force both regulators and investors to consider 
stranded cost issues in making current investment decisions, rather than only leaving 
them for the future, are worth consideration. Here we canvass just a few examples to 
show that energy regulators are already considering this as a way of encouraging new 
investments associated with grid decarbonization 
 
One way to encourage such investments to build expensive new infrastructure 
projects, especially where there is uncertainty about the future, is to accelerate recovery 
for construction costs to the front end, when construction is actually occurring—rather 
than requiring infrastructure to be actually built and operating before recovery is 
permitted.162 Several jurisdictions permit this approach, which is being used most notably 
for the only new nuclear reactors under construction.163 This approach incentivizes 
investors to move forward with significant capital undertakings even against the 
backdrop of uncertainty by lessening any concern that if regulatory treatment of a project 
changes mid-construction, they will not have to repeat history’s nuclear cancelation 
episode. On the other hand, this approach shifts some of the burden of this uncertainty to 																																																								161	See	supra	Part	I.B.2.			
162 This is typically referred to as the “used and useful” requirement, and is found in a number of 
jurisdictions’ statutes. For example, Pennsylvania law required that rates for electricity be fixed without 
consideration of a utility’s expenditures for nuclear power generation plants that were planned but never 
built because they were not “used and useful in service to the public.”  66 Pa. Stat. §1315 (Supp. 1988).  
Utilities incurring millions of dollars in preliminary construction expenses to recover these costs from 
customers sued Pennsylvania regulators, alleging that this was an unconstitutional taking of their property 
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Ultimately, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania law, reasoning that the “end result” was just and reasonable 
and the Takings Clause does not dictate a specific method for cost recovery. Duquesne Light Co. v. 
Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) (“The economic judgments required in rate proceedings are often 
hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single correct result.  The Constitution is not designed to arbitrate 
these economic niceties.”).   
163 See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 330-36 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing FERC's 
methods of cost recovery during construction, includigng allowance for funds used during construction 
(AFUDC) and construction work in progress (CWIP)); Georgia Nuclear Financing Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-2-
25(c)(3) (2009) (note that Georgia’s statute applies only to nuclear reactors approved within a limited time 
window, making Southern Company the only eligible company); Georgia Power's Application for the 
Certification of Units 3 and 4 at Plant Vogtle and Updated Integrated Resource Plan, No. 27,800, 2010 WL 
2647607 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 17, 2010) [hereinafter Georgia Power’s Application] (finding 
Georgia Power's inclusion of CWIP in rate base would benefit ratepayers). Compare Base Load Review 
Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-220(2) (2011) (extending CWIP recover to both nuclear and coal, provided 
that coal plants must comply with Best Available Control Technology for air emissions as defined by 
EPA); FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 25-6.0423(6) (2007) (permitting a utility to petition the Florida Public 
Service Commission to recover carrying costs). 
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customers. Their interests are protected only minimally: they have the predictability of 
CWIP being spread over a set time period, and (using Georgia as an example) they have 
at least some oversight through the regulatory process, which requires periodic reports by 
the utility.164 But construction disputes, delays, and increased costs can remain an issue.165  
 
 Cost recovery can also be apportioned to in-service assets as they come online, 
enabling investors to earn a return even for projects that are not yet fully complete. For 
example, Mississippi Power’s Kemper County Energy Facility is an integrated 
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant that will be accompanied by carbon capture 
technology.166 It is designed to use lignite coal and will be the first plant to employ these 
technologies at this scale (its capacity is 582 MW). It is not yet fully online, but the 
state’s PUC has approved cost recovery for the parts of the plant that are already in 
service and generating electricity. The Kemper facility has also been plagued by 
construction delays and increased costs,167 but these have been allocated somewhat 
between investors and customers. There is a cap on the costs to customers associated with 
the power plant portion of the project,168 but uncapped costs are those associated with the 
lignite mine, CO2 pipeline, and “improvements to design.”169 Mississippi Power’s parent 
company reports it has taken a $2.5 billion write down.170  
 
 At the federal level, the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) 
permits certain renewable energy projects to recover their investments through 
depreciation deductions.171  To qualify for the 50% first-year bonus depreciation, these 
projects must be in service by January 1, 2018.172  Some states are also allowing for an 
excise tax on energy sales to finance a trust fund to jump start renewable investments173 
or have consider guaranteed cost recovery for renewable projects, to avoid the used and 
useful uncertainty that plagued nuclear plants.174  
 																																																								
164 See, e.g., O.C.G.A § 46-3A-7(b) (requiring monitoring reports); Georgia Power’s Application, supra 
note >> (additionally requiring monthly status reports on CWIP). 
165 E.g., Thomas Overton, Even More Delays and Cost Overruns for Vogtle Expansion, POWER (Feb. 2, 
2015) (detailing new reports of cost overruns, delays, and construction litigation). 
166 See Mississippi Power, Facts, at http://www.mississippipower.com/about-energy/plants/kemper-county-
energy-facility/facts.  
167 Indeed, the plant lost its tax credit because it opened too late.  
168 See Mississippi Power, Kemper County energy facility, at 
http://www.mississippipower.com/pdf/kemper/Kemper-Cost-Breakdown.pdf.  
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Dep’t of Energy, Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS), at  
http://energy.gov/savings/modified-accelerated-cost-recovery-system-macrs (last visited June 7, 2016). 
172 Id.  
173 See, e.g., RENEWABLE ENERGY RESULTS FOR MASSACHUSETTS: A REPORT ON THE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
TRUST FUND 1998-2008 (2008), online at 
http://masstech.org/sites/mtc/files/documents/2008%20Renewable%20Energy%20Trust%20Report_0.pdf. 
174 Section 366.92(4), of Florida Statutes, enacted in 2008, provides for full cost recovery by a public utility 
of all reasonable and prudent costs incurred for renewable energy projects that are zero greenhouse gas 
emitting at the point of generation, up to a total of 110 megawatts statewide.   Florida has also considered 
allowing renewable projects should be allowed similar early cost recovery to that available for nuclear 
plants.  However, so far these proposals have not been enacted into law.   
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 These examples show just a few ways that regulators can address uncertainty by 
providing investors some compensation for risk early on—whether during construction or 
early in an asset’s life—so that the project’s full lifetime need not pass before investors 
fully receive compensation for the risks they take on in their investments. For those 
capital-intensive projects involving first-mover technologies, or projects facing high 
levels of uncertainty, such arrangements can help alleviate investor reluctance.  They 
come at some cost initially, but by reducing investor uncertainty, they have promise of 
reducing the overall regulatory cost of capital for projects in comparison to only allowing 
for stranded cost recovery decades into the future.  Either customers or taxpayers will 
bear these stranded costs, however, so it remains crucial for a regulatory process that 
carefully assesses the need for the project and the overall benefits and burdens to ensure 
that the investments are worthwhile.  By placing all of these decisions at the front end of 
a regulatory examination of the value of energy infrastructure, such a temporal shift 
would better allow regulators to look at how the cost of capital for each energy resource 
fits into a more general assessment of the cost of capital for the firm and for the energy 
system more generally as we transition toward grid decarbonization. 
 
 One concern with these methods of temporal risk shifting is that, to the extent that 
they focus solely on the present value of the investor or firm’s financial costs, they treat 
the non-investor attributes of all energy resources the same. For example, basing early 
stranded cost recovery purely on compensating market risk treats the environmental and 
reliability attributes of every energy resource equally, even if these are not valued by 
investors because of the lack of any current pricing mechanism that produces a revenue 
stream.  As an illustration, new natural gas plants are often touted as providing a “bridge” 
to the low carbon energy system, while a new nuclear plant may provide a longer-term 
resource for decarbonization.175  Even if the financial risks associated with each project 
were otherwise similar, providing similar risk compensation to incentivize investments in 
both resources would lead to overinvestment in gas plants and contribute to carbon lock-
in by delaying their retirement in the future, when lower carbon alternatives can be 
deployed.  In other words, unless other public values are considered in setting these 
incentives, early stranded cost compensation based entirely on reducing financial risks to 
investors could readily suffer from the same narrow-mindedness as past stranded cost 
compensation, effectively leaving stranded public values that are central to the transition 
to decarbonization.   
 
Regulators in the past have failed to address stranded benefits and broader values 
beyond investor protection, in part because an ex post stranded cost compensation 
regulatory process rewards firms that ignore or withhold disclosing them.  In the past, 
firms seeking ex post compensation did not have incentives to claim future benefits that 
																																																								
175 One study, for example, see production of electricity from natural gas peaking in the year 2030, after 
which its deployment will begin to decline.  See Nelson et al., supra note >>, at 25.  On the stranded cost 
problem associated with natural gas infrastructure, see also Robert Walton, Why Natural Gas Investments 
Could Spell Trouble for Electric Utilities, UTILITY DIVE, Feb. 8, 2016, online at 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-natural-gas-investments-could-spell-trouble-for-electric-
utilities/413368/. 
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might offset these costs until the stranded cost compensation is resolved.176  By contrast, 
addressing stranded costs at the front end would force all firms offering energy resources 
to be transparent about both the costs and benefits associated with those resources.  To 
combat concerns about certain energy values or attributes not being priced in energy 
markets–for example, absent a carbon price, low-carbon energy resources may fail to 
attract investors in the first place--legislatures or regulators could address environmental 
attributes in approaching incentives designed to attract investors to new projects.  
Alternatively, regulators could condition early recovery and other approvals on sunset 
provisions.177 For example, a legislature concerned about the need to ultimately shift 
away from natural gas might set schedules tapering the availability of cost recovery over 
time.178 Plants’ licenses could also include firm expiration dates, creating a presumption 
of closure rather than renewal.179   
 
 Shifting compensation for these kinds of risks to the front-end of an asset’s may, 
of course, increase the firm’s cost of capital for some new energy projects. Inevitably, 
this will come at some cost to consumers, but no one claims that the transition to 
decarbonization will be cheap.  A higher return on investment will be essential to 
attracting new investors to low carbon infrastructure such as next-generation nuclear 
power plants, large-scale renewable plants, and expensive new transmission lines to 
facilitate broader regional deployment of renewable energy.  In addition, although the 
cost of capital for some investments may go up when initial investments are being 
considered, it is not clear that the firm’s overall cost of capital (or what is known as the 
regulatory cost of capital) will follow suit, as regulators decades into the future will not 
face the same pressures of wasteful lobbying by incumbent firms to provide for back end 
stranded cost recovery.180  And even if the cost of capital for some firms were to increase, 
applying these kinds of principles to all investment compensation decisions would work 
to reduce the system-wide (trans-firm) cost of capital related to decarbonized energy 
infrastructure. 
 
Equally important, providing incentives to attract investors to new decarbonized 
energy investments cannot, on its own, overcome lock-in where existing carbon-intensive 
energy resources remain in operation, facing lower marginal operational costs.  Raising 
the return on investment to address uncertainty for new resources would attract new 																																																								
176 See supra note >> (citing accounting article on this disclosure problem with ex post stranded cost 
recovery).   
177 One recent article refers to these kinds of proactive limited approvals as “sunrise” provisions.   See Chris 
Serkin & Michael Vandenbergh, forthcoming . . . . . .   (arguing for a sort of sunset on the approval of new 
energy resources that have an adverse carbon-impact, based on a front incentive coupled with an 
enforceable promise not to lobby for keeping the resource in operation indefinitely) (on file with authors). 
178 See also Weissman, supra note [3], at 2 (proposing that legislatures set final dates after which no new 
NG plants will be approved). 
179 Of course, whether this would be a state or federal option would depend on the type of plant.  
180 To the extent there is full recovery in present value for the risks associated with stranded costs at the 
front end, an enforceable regulatory mechanism to “sunset” permits or plants could help limit investors for 
having a second-bite at apple and lobbying regulators for such recovery in the future.  See Serkin & 
Vandenbergh, supra note [182].  Absent such a provision, any ex post assessment of stranded cost would 
need to be considered nothing more than a true-up to past compensation. We acknowledge of course, that 
wasteful lobbying for other reasons is a fact of our political society. 
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investment dollars, but this could backfire if, once new infrastructure goes online, the 
marginal costs of deploying low-carbon resources do not compare favorably to carbon-
intensive resources built decades ago.181   
 
To avoid carbon lock-in it is thus just as imperative for regulators to address 
stranded costs for existing energy resources, such as the examples involving older nuclear 
and coal plants that we have highlighted in Part II, in a similar manner.  For example, 
regulators providing stranded cost compensation for existing resources should not only be 
attentive to protecting a firm’s investors to ensure that financial risks are sufficiently 
compensated, but they must also be attentive to the reliability and environmental 
attributes of energy resources.  This might, for example, lead regulators to approach 
stranded investments for some existing coal plants differently from some existing nuclear 
plants, or for treating existing gas pipelines differently across geographic areas, based on 
the need for capacity to support decarbonized energy infrastructure in different regions.  
If incentives for new energy resources compensate investors for risks in a manner that 
contemplates values such as reliability and environmental attributes, so too should 
compensation for risks associated with older resources.  A failure to treat risk 
compensation for new and existing resources in a similar manner regarding these values 
in stranded cost compensation could distort the cost of capital to favor existing resources, 
resulting in the same kind of wasteful delay that characterized grandfathering of existing 
power plants under the Clean Air Act.182   
 
2. Reconciling (Some) Stranded Cost Recovery With 
Competitive Markets 
 
In most of the examples discussed above, cost recovery through ratemaking is the 
norm (as it remains in most states), and regulators can creatively permit investors to 
receive early compensation for risks to avoid future stranded cost issues.  But, to raise an 
issue that has puzzled energy lawyers at least since FERC’s Order 888, what regulatory 
approaches are available in competitive interstate energy markets?  We believe that 
overcoming stranded cost myopia with the transition towards decarbonized energy 
infrastructure will require energy law to resolve some of these issues, and offer here a 
few thoughts on steps toward that goal.   
 
Consider again the current issue of marginal merchant nuclear power plants, 
which are at  risk of early closure notwithstanding their reliability and climate benefits. 
As suggested above, this particular stranded cost issue is driven by an imperfect 
market,183 and there are good reasons to treat these resources differently than fossil-fueled 
plants because of their comparative reliability and environmental benefits. The question 
that remains, however, is whether regulators can endorse compensating investor risks for 
certain forms of power generation against the backdrop of competitive interstate energy 																																																								
181 One of the authors has made this point, suggesting that once built, new transmission lines might be 
utilized to favor existing resources like coal plants with lower marginal costs.  See Rossi, Trojan Horse of 
Transmission Line Siting, supra note [138] (making this point). 
182 See, e..g., Revesz & Kong, supra note [160], at 1632.   183	As	is	discussed	in	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	[22].	
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markets, or whether federal competition policy preempts regulators from taking such an 
approach.184 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing185 
likely places some constraints on stranded cost recovery, at least for issues arising from 
flaws in the wholesale markets. In Hughes, the Court invalidated a Maryland scheme that 
provided incentives for constructing new natural gas plants.186 Perceiving the wholesale 
capacity market to be insufficient to incentivize new construction within its borders, 
Maryland enacted a scheme whereby the power plant owners would be compensated with 
a fixed revenue stream for capacity that cleared the relevant market.187 In other words, the 
compensation was designed to provide more revenue for the plants than what they would 
receive on the capacity market..188  Maryland is one of thirteen states that have authorized 
their utilities to operate in PJM – a regional transmission organization that operates the 
largest organized wholesale power market in the United States.  Under the Federal Power 
Act (FPA), FERC has “approved the PJM capacity auction as the sole rate setting 
mechanism for sale of capacity to PJM, and has deemed the clearing price per se just and 
reasonable.”189  Because Maryland’s auction for new in-state generation interfered with 
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale sales of energy under the FPA, 
the Court upheld a lower court determination that the Maryland scheme is preempted 
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.190   
 
The Court left observors questioning how far beyond its facts Hughes might 
extend.191 Although it expressly emphasized the narrowness of its holding,192 the Court 
suggested that states may not tether revenues to wholesale market participation or 
condition payments on capacity clearing the relevant auction.193 At the same time, the 
Court left open “the permissibility of various other measures States might employ to 
encourage development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants, 
direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the 																																																								184	For	arguments	suggesting	that	states’	policy	options	are	constrained	depending	on	their	restructuring	status,	see	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	>>,	at	209;	Hammond	&	Pierce,	supra	note	>>,	at	16-17.	
185 Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 186	New	Jersey	attempted	a	similar	approach,	which	the	Third	Circuit	invalidated	in	PPL	Energyplus,	LLC	v.	Solomon,	766	F.3d	241	(3d	Cir.	2014).	187	136	S.	Ct.	at	1293.	188	Id.	at	1293.	
189 Id. at 1297..   
190 Id. at 1299.   191	E.g.	Emily	Hammond,	Hughes	v.	Talen	Energy	Mktg,	LLC:	Energy	Law’s	
Jurisdictional	Boundaries:	Take	Three,	GEO.	WASH.	L.	REV.	DOCKET	(Oct.	Term	2015),	at	http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-laws-jurisdictional-boundaries-take-three/.	192	Id.	at	1299	(“Our	holding	is	limited:	we	reject	Maryland’s	program	only	because	it	disregards	an	interstate	wholesale	rate	required	by	FERC.”).	193	Id.		
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energy sector.”194 The concepts of “tethering,” “conditioning,” and “re-regulation” all 
suggest limits on the spectrum of state options in moving toward decarbonization, but the 
contours of those limits are unclear.   
 
Hughes appears to constrain the ability of state regulators to adopt investment 
incentives to compensate investors for their risk (including stranded cost recovery) if 
these target federal wholesale power market prices.  After all, these kinds of incentives or 
subsidies would seem to be fundamentally at odds with federal policies favoring 
competitive power markets, especially to the extent that they invite states to give 
incumbent firms favorable treatment over out-of-state sources of energy or otherwise 
distorting price signals in interstate markets.  Indeed, FERC’s initial response to the 
decision indicates some hostility towards stranded cost recovery for legacy coal or 
nuclear plants that are no longer competitive in regional wholesale power markets 
operating under similar rules as in Maryland.195   
 
In traditionally regulated states like Georgia and South Carolina, however, 
forward-looking regulatory initiatives for new clean energy construction do not seem 
problematic. These states are not within competitive wholesale markets like PJM, nor 
have they restructured at the retail level.196 Unlike Maryland, therefore, these states have 
retained their full authority to decide what values to compensate. Although wholesale 
costs must be carried forward into state ratemaking proceedings,197 states retain authority 
to set the utility’s return on investment. Moreover, the wholesale costs in these states are 
not derived from comptetitive auctions, but rather from bilateral contracts.198 Providing 
compensation for the carrying costs of construction, therefore, do not “second-guess” or 
“disregard[] an interstate wholesale rate FERC has deemed just and reasonable….”199 
Thus, in contrast to the regional capacity market that FERC had approved for PJM, in 
many other parts of the country retail reliability (and the need for new power supply 
capacity) remains within the wheelhouse of state regulators and is not priced in the 
interstate wholesale market.200   
 
																																																								194	Id.		
195 See FERC Rejects PUCO-Approved FirstEnergy, AEP Power Deals, THE PLAIN DEALER, April 28, 
2016, online at http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2016/04/ferc_rejects_puco_approval_of.html 
(describing FERC’s rejection of monthly surcharges aimed at protecting existing coal and nuclear plants 
from competitive markets).   196	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	[22],	at	209.	197	Nantahala	Power	&	Light	Co.	v.	Thornburg,	476	U.S.	953,	961	(1986).		198	For	further	discussion,	see	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	[22],	at	154.	
199 Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298. 
200 Even where, as in PJM, capacity markets provide some reliability pricing in the wholesale market, it is 
not clear that they provide a perfect market valuation of reliability values associated with different energy 
resources.  The American Public Power Association, for example, has highlighted how long-term contracts 
provide a superior way of promoting reliability in comparison to capacity markets, and that capacity 
markets can result in different reliability pricing based on how a state chooses to address its retail market.  
See Staying Power of a Bad Idea: Capacity Markets’ Reliability Pricing Mechanism, online at 
http://blog.publicpower.org/sme/?p=761. 
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Still, two-thirds of electricity use in the United States takes place within the 
organized competitive markets. And absent any effective market price on carbon (such as 
a national carbon tax), regional initiatives (including PJM’s capacity market) fail entirely 
to price the carbon attributes of various sources of energy.201  As Justice Ginsburg wrote 
for the Hughes majority, “We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an 
interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.”202  Although somewhat unclear, the majority 
seems to leave open state flexibility to adopt power supply incentives and subsidies that 
advance other values, beyond what is reflected in FERC-approved market prices.203  
Thus, regulatory measures that states utilitize to promote clean power generation, 
especially those based on the carbon attributes of different energy resources, ought to be 
able to coexist with FERC’s regulation of wholesale power markets. 
 
Hughes therefore leaves states considerable space to endorse important regulatory 
values in the transition to a decarbonized grid where these values are not priced in the 
wholesale competitive power market regulated by FERC.  In addressing stranded cost 
compensation for the risks associated with energy infrastructure, state regulators should 
be encouraged to approach new infrastructure with the aim of advancing values such as 
low carbon energy.  Of course, as Hughes reminds us, such efforts cannot be motivated 
by or target a FERC-approved exclusive scheme for pricing wholesale power sales, such 
as the capacity market operated by PJM.  However, to the extent that stranded cost 
recovery is aimed at social values that are not presently valued in competitive market 
prices as approved by FERC, such as retail reliability or carbon impacts of various energy 
resources, it is not inconsistent with Hughes’ preemption analysis for states to provide 
incentives or subsidies to compensate these energy resources differently.   
 
In a new experiment that will test this assertion and the limits of Hughes, the N.Y. 
Public Service Commission (NYPSC) has adopted a Clean Energy Standard that will 
among other things compensate upstate merchant nuclear power plants for the social cost 
of carbon that their electricity generation avoids.204 Under the Zero Emission Credit 
approach applicable to these plants, the nuclear energy companies operating the relevant 
plants will receive payments equivalent to the social cost of carbon, netting out revenues 
from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), for the first two-year period of the 
Credit.205 This approach seems to fall on the “safe” side of Hughes, because it makes no 
reference to the wholesale markets and prices an attribute not considered on those 
markets.  In later years, however, there will also be a price adjustment for wholesale 																																																								201	Hammond	&	Spence,	supra	note	[22],	at	174.	
202 Hughes, 136 S.Ct. at 1299. 
203 Id.  Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also underscored “the importance of protecting the States’ ability 
to contribute, within their regulatory domain, to the Federal Power Act’s goal of ensuring a sustainable 
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energy and capacity market revenues.206 Although the NYPSC was careful to note that it 
was not setting a price floor for nuclear power,207 the fact that later compensation directly 
accounts for wholesale market revenues is at least worrisome under Hughes.208  
 
Despite the uncertainties created by Hughes, we are optimistic about the general 
viability of stranded cost approaches in furtherance of grid decarbonization. That 
decarbonization is directed at a value not incorporated into the wholesale markets means 
states ought to be able to craft a variety of approaches without running afoul of Hughes. 
To the extent that federal involvement is necessary to address some stranded cost issues, 
we are encouraged that FERC has experience with such policies just as the states do.  
 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Stranded cost recovery for investor risk has played a central role with energy 
industry transformation, often helping to grease the wheels of transition.  However, as 
past experiments with stranded cost recovery show, it also has suffered from a myopia 
that has delayed some desirable industry transitions and left stranded important values 
that firms and energy markets fail to price.  The impending transition to a decarbonizated 
grid cannot ignore these timing and stranded value issues and thus presents a unique 
opportunity to improve energy law’s approach to stranded cost compensation.  As in the 
past, stranded cost compensation will prove important (and we believe essential) to the 
next energy transition, but it can and should be approached in a manner that overcomes 
decarbonization’s obstacles, reassures investors in new infrastructure without distorting 
price signals, and recognizes important energy resource attributes that markets fail to 
price.  
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